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TEACHING THE THEORIES OF
EVOLUTION AND SCIENTIFIC
CREATIONISM IN THE PUBLIC
SCHOOLS: THE FIRST
AMENDMENT RELIGION CLAUSES
AND PERMISSIBLE RELIEF

Traditional methods of religious training and transmission of
moral values have been irreversibly altered by the changing role
of the family, the church, and the public school. 1 The expanding
role of the public school in this training triggers concern that
these traditional moral and religious values are being displaced. 1
As a result, the appropriate role of religion in the public schools
has become the subject of ongoing, heated debate. 3 Religiously
motivated parents, fearful that their children's religious beliefs
are undermined by morally "neutral" public school education,
have persuaded school officials to import prayer,• Bible study,0
and the Ten Commandments6 into some public classrooms. The
Supreme Court has struck down each of these attempts as an
impermissible mix of church and state. 7
A related controversy concerns the appropriateness of teach1. See, e.g., Hirschoff, Parents and the Public School Curriculum: ls There a Right
to Have One's Child Excused from Objectionable Instruction?, 50 S. CAL. L. REV. 871,
882 (1977)(schools have taken on the task of character development, teaching a variety
of virtues such as honesty and hard work).
2. See id. at 873 (noting parental fears that public schools were undermining parental
values); Recent Developments, The Constitutionality Under the Religion Clauses of the
First Amendment of Compulsory Sex Education in Public Schools, 68 MICH. L. REV.
1050, 1050-52 (1970)(noting similar concerns with sex education classes).
3. Compare Church and State Symposium, 24 ST. Louis U.L.J. 183 (1980)(compilation of articles and cases on the permissible role of religion in public schools), with Comment, Accommodating Religion in the Public Schools, 59 NEB. L. REV. 425 (1980)(urging
a more tolerant attitude toward prayer, religious meetings, holiday celebrations, and instruction in certain religious subjects in the public schools).
4. See, e.g., Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962)(holding official classroom prayer
unconstitutional).
5. See, e.g., School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963)(holding classroom recitation of Bible unconstitutional).
6. See, e.g., Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980)(per curiam)(holding state-mandated
posting of the Ten Commandments in schoolrooms unconstitutional).
7. See supra notes 4-6.
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ing the theory of evolution8 in natural science classes. 9 Fundamentalist Christian parents10 who believe the literal biblical account of Creation - "Biblical Creationism"11 - find evo8. Semantic confusion often stems from using the word "evolution" without some
modifier. Evolution has come to mean many things, some of them quite distinct from
what scientists consider the "theory of" evolution. For instance, evolution can mean
merely "a process of change in a certain direction." WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 397 (1977). In a biological sense, evolution can be used to characterize relatively
limited gene mutation and minor genetic variation among different populations of the
same species, e.g., racial differences, and is sometimes called "microevolution" in this
context. See, e.g., G. STEBBINS, VARIATION AND EvOLUTION IN PLANTS at x (1950).
The meaning of "the theory of evolution" intended by this Note, however, is the
"modern synthesis" or "neo-Darwinism," the modern successor of the theory proposed
by Charles Darwin in his book On The Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection.
Neo-Darwinism proposes that life on earth is evolving by mutation, natural selection,
and other subtle natural pressures, from less complex to more complex organisms; that
life has developed from nonliving precursors; and that over long periods of time, perhaps
billions of years, subtle but increasingly adaptive changes have taken place in every
known species. See E. WILSON, T. EISNER, W. BRIGGS, R. DICKERSON, R. METzENBERG, R.
O'BRIEN, M. SUSMAN & w. BOGGS, LIFE ON EARTH 500-21, 631-711 & 760-69 (2d ed. 1978)
(college biology text) [hereinafter cited as LIFE ON EARTH]. Neo-Darwinism in sometimes
called "macroevolution." G. STEBBINS, supra, at x. Attempts to distinguish microevolution from macroevolution are difficult because, though botanists have produced new species in the laboratory by hybridization, the observed "origin" of a new species in nature
has yet to be documented. See L. THURMAN, How TO THINK AsoUT EVOLUTION & OTHER
BIBLE SCIENCE CONTROVERSIES 93-96 (2d ed. 1978). The distinction is further complicated
by some who do not use the term "species," but instead employ a somewhat broader
characterization of life "kinds." Id. at 95. In general, however, the neo-Darwinian theory
of evolution proposes that life formed from primordial organic and inorganic matter and
evolved by speciation to its present composition.
This theory of life's origination and subsequent speciation is sometimes misapprehended as being an explanation of the origin of the universe. Paleobiologists, however,
attempt to explain how life on earth originated from nonlife; they pursue an entirely
separate question from those astrogeophysicists attempting to explain how the galaxies,
solar systems, and planets like the earth, first came to be. This "tenestrial evolution" of
the planets is not what is meant by neo-Darwinism, though some of the same concepts
may apply. Moreover, the question of how the original matter of the universe came to be
lies beyond the realm of any scientific pursuit. See infra notes 44-45 and accompanying
text.
9. Compare Le Clercq, The Monkey Laws and the Public Schools: A Second Consumption?, 27 VAND. L. REV. 209 (1974)(defending the present method of teaching only
the theory of evolution in the classroom), with Note, Freedom of Religion and Science
Instruction in Public Schools, 87 YALE L.J. 515 (1978)(opposing the exclusive presentation of evolutionary theory on constitutional grounds). See generally L. THURMAN, supra
note 8, at 17-35 (explaining the history of the debate and examining the response of the
scientific community).
10. Fundamentalist Christians support "a literal interpretation of the Bible and a
belief in the inerrancy of the Scriptures." McLean v. Arkansas Bd. of Educ., 529 F.
Supp. 1255, 1259 (E.D. Ark. 1982). Organized religions which adhere to this definition
include Seventh-day Adventists, Jehovah's Witnesses, and Independent Baptists. See
Note, supra note 9, at 519-21 nn.21-23.
11. Biblical (Divine) Creationism is a Fundamentalist Christian belief based on a literal reading of Genesis, the first Book of the Old Testament. Biblical Creationism
teaches that a Supreme Being - God - supernaturally created the universe in six creation days. This spontaneous creation out of nothing produced the first humans, Adam
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lutionary theory repugnant to their regligious beliefs and those
they wish to instill in their children. 11 Creationist efforts
to suppress the theory of evolution have, however, historically
failed, 18 as have similar attempts to require the teaching of Biblical Creationism... These setbacks have prompted a new creationist movement which advocates that a creation model with no
direct biblical references - "scientific creationism"111 - be
and Eve, and all other life "kinds" on earth today. Biblical Creationists also believe that
the elapsed time from the Creation to the present measures only in the thousands of
years and that there has been in the interim a Great Flood, survived by Noah and representatives of the earth's flora and fauna. See Genesis 1:1-8:22; see also 1 THE INTERPRETER'S BIBLE 456-548 (N. Harmond ed. 1952); J. MOORE, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON
CREATION/EVOLUTION 27 (1976)("The creation model is an explanatory belief system
based upon the existence of an eternal Creator who established a complete, finished, and
functional universe in all aspects regarding elements, galaxies, stars and planets . . . . ").
12. The biblical account of Creation is considered to be irreconcilable with the neoDarwinian theory of evolution; thus, creationists consider the two approaches mutually
exclusive. See McLean v. Arkansas Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255, 1260 (E.D. Ark.
1982); Note, supra note 9, at 519, 522. Consequently, some believers in creation accounts
conclude that evolution theory actually denies the existence of God. See, e.g., H. MORRIS,
THE TROUBLED WATERS OF EVOLUTION 186 (1974). Others argue that the theory of evolution, though perhaps not antitheistic per se, nevertheless undermines the ethics of Christian religion. See, e.g., A. KEITH, EvoLUTION AND ETHICS 15 (1947), quoted in H. MORRIS,
supra, at 36; see also infra notes 48-62 and accompanying text. Consequently, Fundamentalist Christians have angrily opposed evolutionary theory through legislation and
litigation. See infra note 13.
13. Fundamentalist opposition to evolution theory prompted the statute that was
challenged in the famous Scopes, or "monkey," trial. Scopes v. State, 154 Tenn. 105
(1927). That statute, codified at ch. 27, 1925 Tenn. Pub. Acts 50, and since repealed,
made it a crime to teach the theory of evolution in the public schools of Tennessee.
Although the statute was then upheld, the public ridicule heaped on the statute's supporters effectively stilled enforcement of that and similar statutes around the country.
See Kalven, A Commemorative Case Note - Scopes v. State, 27 U. CHI. L. REv. 505, 507
(1960); Cole, A Witness at the Scopes Trial, Sci. AM., Jan. 1959, at 120, 130. Forty years
later, the Supreme Court finally buried the movement to suppress evolution by striking
down an Arkansas anti-evolution statute as unconstitutional. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393
U.S. 97 (1968).
14. Because the Supreme Court would not allow the theory of evolution to be suppressed, Fundamentalists began to support the teaching of both Biblical Creationism
and evolutionary theory in the classroom. See, e.g., ch. 377, 1973 Tenn. Pub. Acts 1364
(requiring commensurate classroom attention be given to Genesis and to evolution)
(struck down in Daniel v. Waters, 515 F.2d 485 (6th Cir. 1975)); see also Wright v. Houston lndep. School Dist., 366 F. Supp. 1208 (S.D. Tex. 1972)(classroom presentation of
Biblical Creationism held unconstitutional), aff'd per curiam, 486 F.2d 137 (5th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 969 (1974). Most creationists now concede the unconstitutionality of teaching Biblical Creationism. See e.g., SCIENTIFIC CREATIONISM 3 (H. Morris
ed., general ed. 1974); Note, supra note 9, at 553-54.
15. "Scientific creationism" is the name given to a creation model purported to stand
independent of biblical reference. It proposes the "special creation" of all matter and life
relatively recently (in the thousands of years), with little or no change in life "kinds"
since that time. It also posits the theory of "catastrophism" (a catastrophic worldwide
flood) as well as separate ancestry of man and apes. Note, supra note 9, at 554. Its supporters claim that "scientific creationism" is distinct from Biblical Creationism and is
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taught along with the theory of evolution in order to "balance"
the classroom fare. 18 This new approach raises unresolved issues
under the religion clauses of the first amendment17 and compels
a reexamination of the role of science and religion in public
education.
This Note explores the propriety of teaching the theory of
evolution and the scientific creation model in public18 elementary and secondary schools. 19 Part I discusses the powers of the
state and its political subdivisions to set public school policy and
curriculum content and the extent to which those powers are circumscribed by the religion clauses of the first amendment. Part
I concludes that the religion clauses permit the teaching of evolutionary theory in public schools. Part II examines the variety
of judicial and legislative relief potentially available to creationists where the teaching of evolution theory interferes with their
religious beliefs or practices. Part III concludes that, except for a
small group of creationists, the exclusive presentation of the theory of evolution in public schools warrants no constitutionally
based relief.

thus constitutional classroom material. See infra notes 147-74 and accompanying text.
16. The idea of "balancing" evolution with a roughly equivalent presentation of creationist beliefs was first proposed in 1961 by Henry Morris, Director of the Institute for
Creation Research in San Diego, California. Mr. Morris writes extensively on this subject
and his ideas have prompted legal commentary, see, e.g., Note, supra note 9, as well as
legislative response, see, e.g., the Balanced Treatment for Creation-Science and Evolution-Science Act ("Arkansas Balanced Treatment Act"), ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 80-16631670 (1981 Supp.)(held unconstitutional in McLean v. Arkansas Bd. of Educ., 529 F.
Supp. 1255 (E.D. Ark. 1982)); see also Balanced Treatment for Creation-Science and
Evolution-Science Act, LA. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 17:286.1 to .7 (West Supp. 1982)(currently
being challenged in Aguillard v. Treen, Civ. Act. 81-4787 (E.D. La. filed Dec. 3, 1981),
stayed pending jurisdictional decision in Keith v. Louisiana Dep't of Educ., Civ. Act. 81989 § B (M.D . .La. filed Dec. 2, 1981)). The Mississippi Senate has approved a balanced
treatment hill, S. 2256 (Miss. 1982)(not passed by Miss. House), and a number of states,
including Georgia and Florida, are contemplating passage of similar bills. N.Y. Times,
Mar. 7, 1982, § 4, at 19, col. 1 (midw. ed.).
17. U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
18. The religion issues discussed in this Note do not arise in a private or parochial
school. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925)(finding a constitutional right
to attend private secretarian schools that teach religion).
19. This Note does not cover the post-secondary setting. A different standard of concern for sectarian influence applies in universities due to the greater knowledge and maturity of college students. See Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 686 (1971)(finding
college students less vulnerable to the coercive aspects of religion courses~.
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THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
RELIGION CLAUSES IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOL

The states have no constitutional duty to establish public
schools. 20 Once established, however, state schools must comply
with certain provisions of the federal Con~titution. 21 The first
amendment's "religion clauses" place two important limitations
on the government's authority over public education. 22 These
clauses command that Congress, and the states via the fourteenth amendment, 28 "shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof."~• This
section considers whether teaching the theory of evolution violates either religion clause. Because the Supreme Court approaches each clause differently, they must be examined separately.211 This section concludes that under the Supreme Court's
20. See San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973)("Education, of
course, is not among the rights afforded explicit protection under our Federal
Constitution.").
21. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574 (1975).
22. Within these constitutional bounds, the states have almost plenary control over
their educational institutions because public schools are arms of the states under the
powers reserved by the tenth amendment. See Comment, School Boards, Schoolbooks
and the Freedom to Learn, 59 YALE L.J. 928, 929 (1950). An educational provision is
typically found in every state constitution. See, e.g., N.J. CONST. art. 8, § 4, 1f 1; N.Y.
CONST. art. XI, § 1; R.I. CONST. art. XII, § 1; Note, Schoolbooks, School Boards and the
Constitution, 80 CoLUM. L. REv. 1092, 1095 (1980). See generally id. at 1095-97 (discussing the broad discretion granted state and local school boards by state constitutional
provisions).
Consequently, the states may add to, alter, or completely eliminate any part of their
curriculum, so long as the change is not unconstitutional. States possess an "undoubted
right to prescribe the curriculum for [their] public schools" so long as not restrictive of
constitutional guarantees. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 107 (1968). But cf. Meyer
v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923)(invalidating state law which forbade foreign language
instruction in public schools). The Meyer Court cited no textual constitutional limitation
on such action, however, and it has been suggested that the Court's decision was based
on an anachronistic "substantive due process" approach. _See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J.
YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 624 (1978). The Epperson Court eschewed the Meyer
Court's reliance on a broad reading of due process. 393 U.S. at 105-06. Nonetheless, citations to Meyer in recent cases suggest a revival of substantive due process analysis, at
least outside the area of economic regulation. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152,
153 (1973); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499, 501 (1977)(plurality opinion); see also Epstein, Substantive Due Process by Any Other Name: The Abortion
Cases, 1973 SuP. CT. REV. 159. The current vitality of Meyer in the public schools has
not, however, been determined. See infra notes 182-87.
23. See, e.g., Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973); Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
24. U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
25. The Supreme Court has not always viewed the clauses as distinct. See, e.g.,
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). By 1947, however, the separate scope of
each clause began to emerge. See, e.g., Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 13-15
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analyses of each of these clauses, evolutionary theory is a constitutionally permissible element of a public school curriculum.
A.

Evolution Theory and the Establishment Clause

The establishment clause was designed in part to guarantee
separation of church and state. 26 A literal interpretation of this
command led the Supreme Court to suggest a strict separation
between the two. 27 Later cases, however, recognized a zone of
(1947). The Everson Court suggested that the dual clauses were complementary. Id.
While this is often true, later cases recognized the potential conflict between the clauses.
See, e.g., Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 788 (1973); School Dist. v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 296-99 (1963)(Brennan, J., concurring). See generally J. Now AK,
R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 22, at 849 (describing the "natural antagonism between a command not to establish religion and a command not to inhibit its practice");
Choper, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment: Reconciling the Conflict, 41 U.
PITT. L. REV. 673, 674 (1980)(analyzing the "seemingly irreconcilable conflict"). This recognition led to entirely distinct methods of analysis. Compare Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403
U.S. 602 (197l)(outlining establishment test), with Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205
(1972)(applying a much different free exercise analysis).
26. "Framer's intent" arguments are not always useful or enlightening. See School
Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 237 (1963)(Brennan, J., concurring)("A too literal quest
for the advice of the Founding Fathers upon [the religion clauses seems] futile and misdirected."); Choper, Religion in the Public School: A Proposed Constitutional Standard,
47 MINN. L. REV. 329, 332 (1963)(scholarly investigation of the precise intention of the
Framers has produced antithetic conclusions). But see Anastaplo, The Religion Clauses
of the First Amendment, 11 MEM. ST. U.L. REv. 151, 182 (1981)(the Framers' original
intent "seems . . . far simpler than one would suspect from the Court's convoluted pronouncements"). Nevertheless, there is little disagreement that these first words of the
Bill of Rights were written to guarantee the religious freedom and protection from state
control which had prompted many Europeans to immigrate to America. See Everson v.
Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 9-11 (1947)(detailing the liistory of religious persecution in
Europe at the time of colonization and the efforts of Madison and Jefferson to guarantee
religious liberty by drafting the religion clauses); A. STOKES & L. PFEFFER, CHURCH AND
STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 3 (1964)(describing the centuries of religious persecution
preceding the colonization of America); see also Goldberg, The Constitutional Status of
American Science, 1979 U. ILL. L.F. 1, 4-5 (explaining the motivation of the Framers to
protect secular pursuits such as science from religious oppression); Comment, supra note
3, at 427-29 (explaining the tolerant religious attitudes of the colonists which arose out of
their experience with religious persecution).
Beyond this, there is little hope of ascertaining the exact intent of the Framers in light
of the vigorous debate that accompanied the addition of the religion clauses to the Constitution. Concerns ranged from too much religion in government to too much govenment involvement in religion: "Some supporters of the establishment clause sought to
protect the state from the church, others sought to protect the church from the state,
and still others opposed federal establishment of religion because it threatened state establishments they favored." Goldberg, supra, at 5. n.23 (citing M. HowE, THE GARDEN
AND THE WILDNERNESS 6, 25-26 (1965)); see also Note, The Establishment Clause and its
Application in the Public School, 59 NEB. L. REV. 1143, 1145-47 (1980). See generally J.
NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 22, at 849-50.
27. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947). Historic fear of government
attempts to influence and control religious beliefs apparently led to this per se interpre-
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permissible accommodation. 28 These decisions found strict separation impermissibly hostile to religion 29 as well as a denial of
the pervasive influence of religion on American institutions. 30
The proper role of government, therefore, is neither to support
nor undermine religion or a particular religious point of view,
but rather to remain "neutral" between religion and irreligion. 31
tation. See School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 221 (1963)("a union of government
and religion tends to destroy government and to degrade religion"). This approach
prompted the Everson Court to detail some of the contours of the establishment clause:
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can
pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over
another. Neither can force nor influence a person to go to or to remain away
from church against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any
. religion.
330 U.S. at 15.
28. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971)("the line of separation, far
from being a 'wall,' is a blurred, indistinct and variable barrier depending on all the
circumstances of a particular relationship"); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 312
(1952)("The First Amendment ... does not say that in every and all respects there shall
be a separation of Church and State.").
29. See Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 312 (1952)(suggesting that if the rule were
absolute separation, "the state and religion would be aliens to each other - hostile,
suspicious, and even unfriendly"); School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222
(1963)(holding that state action may not advance or inhibit religion); see also Figinski,
Military Chaplains - A Constitutionally Permissible Accommodation Between Church
and State, 24 Mo. L. REV. 377, 408-09 (1964)(citing the need to avoid impermissible
hostility as a justification for providing chaplains and churches at military bases).
30. The variety of permissible state/religion conjunctions includes chaplains at military establishments, prayers invoked prior to legislative sessions, and the use of "In God
We Trust" on coins, buildings, and documents. School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203,
296-304 (1963)(Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Douglas, writing for the majority in Zorach v. Clauson, suggested that strict separation would preclude police and fire protection for religious groups, the use of appeals to the Almighty in courtroom oaths, and even
the Supreme Court's opening supplication, "God save the United States and this Honorable Court": "We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being."
343 U.S. at 312-13. For a long list of governmental "aids" to religion, see Engel v. Vitale,
370 U.S. 421, 439-43 (1962)(Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 446-49 (Stewart, J.,
dissenting).
31. See, e.g., Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 109 (1968)(Arkansas anti-evolution
law found not to be "an act of religious neutrality"); School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S.
203, 222 (1963); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 409 (1963). But see Le Clercq, supra
note 9, at 216 ("The litany of such metaphysical concepts as religious neutrality [is]
confusing and of little analytical or predictive value.").
Confusion has arisen out of the establishment cases because the Supreme Court once
suggested that government must maintain "neutrality between religion and religion, and
between religion and nonreligion." Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968). Taken
literally, this standard would bar government from pursuing nonreligious, i.e., secular,
goals - an absurd result. "The appropriate dichotomy is between religion and irreligion,
not between religion and nonreligion: government must remain neutral, not between
those who hold no religious viewpoint, but between those who favor and those who oppose some or all religious views." Merel, The Protection of Individual Choice: A Consistent Understanding of Religion Under the First Amendment, 45 U. CHI. L. REv. 805,
813 (1978)(emphasis added); see also Schwarz, No Imposition of Religion: The Establishment Clause Value, 77 YALE L.J. 692, 698-99, 719 (1968)(distinguishing "religion,"
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To insure this neutrality, state action must meet a three-part
test: first, the action must have a secular purpose; second, the
action must not have as its principal or primary effect the advancement or inhibition of religion; and finally, the action must
not foster an excessive governmental entanglement with religion. 32 Any government program which satisfies this test avoids
an establishment violation. 33
"irreligion," and "nonreligion"). By not recognizing these distinctions, the Court assumes
the impossible task of maintaining impartiality between religion and nonreligion in a
government whose opinions are supposed to be solely nonreligious. Indeed, concerns
about establishing a "religion of secularism" should be irrelevant to a government that is
ultimately premised on wholly secular politics. Merel, supra, at 813.
32. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). In practice and in the cases there is
only a metaphysical difference between purpose and primary effect. See Merel, supra
note 31, at 826 (although the Court claims secular purpose and primary effects "are distinct, the facts on which it has relied to determine primary effects are often indistinguishable from [those relied upon to determine] legislative purpose"). Ostensibly the secular purpose test is a test of legislative motivation. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612. In Epperson,
however, the Court relied on newspaper ads and letters to the editor to ascertain purpose. 393 U.S. at 108 n.16. Other cases look beyond the legislature and focus on the
supporters of certain state actions. See McLean v. Arkansas Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp.
1255 (E.D. Ark. 1982)(making the purpose of the Fundamentalist sponsors of the bill an
important consideration); Hendren v. Campbell, 45 U.S.L.W. 2530 (May 17, 1977)
(Super. Ct. Ind. Apr. 14, 1977)(holding that the religious purpose of the book publisher
triggers the establishment clause prohibition); see also Merel, supra note 31, at 824
("Purpose can be tested by reference to a number of factors, including legislative or
administrative history and the avowed intent of individual legislators."). But cf. Note,
supra note 9, at 562 (purpose test should not focus on the authors of textbooks but on
the intent of the public school authorities who adopt it). In addition, "purpose" can
mean intended effect. In this way, purpose and effect are merged, because a religious
effect is prohibited whether intended or not. Consequently, a more accurate terminology
would be "proponent motivation" for purpose, and "primary intended and/or actual effects," that is, the hoped for and/or practical outcome of the action, for primary effect.
Cf. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 373 (1967)(examining, legislation "in terms of its
'immediate objective,' its 'ultimate effect' and its 'historical context and the conditions
existing prior to its enactment' "); Merel, supra note 31, at 824-25 (suggesting an "obvious effects" test for secular purpose, similar to that used to discover de· facto racial discrimination). Thus, this Note's use of the "purpose and primary effect" terminology
should be viewed as conforming with a standard and convenient shorthand rather than
an affirmation of its conceptual accuracy.
Another conceptual difficulty with the Supreme Court's establishment test is its failure
to define explicity "religion." Instead of making this determination at the outset, the
Court seems to make the determination implicitly; after evaluating the complained-of
activity under the Lemon test, the Court concludes it is religion if it fails and not religion
if it passes. Part of this sidestepping by the Court stems from the fact that no recent
establishment case has presented the question of whether the activity was, in fact, "religion." Merel, supra note 31, at 836. The Court has made pronouncements of what constitutes religion in the free exercise area, but the scope of the definition necessary to include the sometimes unorthodox beliefs of free exercise complainants is much too broad
to be of use in establishment cases. See infra notes 41-43 & 91-95 and accompanying
text.
33. The Supreme Court has not yet decided whether public school instruction in evolutionary theory survives this scrutiny. Epperson v. Arkansas held implicitly that teach-
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1. Secular purpose- Legislation prompted primarily by religious motivations violates the establishment clause and will not
be upheld. 3 " It is often difficult, however, to determine whether
the purpose of legislation is religious or secular. 35 Even a specific
statutory avowal of nonreligious intent - such as a preamble
listing numerous secular purposes - is not dispositive. 36 In
Stone v. Graham, 37 for example, the Court went behind the
stated secular purpose of a statute mandating the posting of the
Ten Commandments in classrooms, finding that the "undeniably
sacred" text promoted Judeo-Christian religious beliefs. 38 Thus,
ing the theory of evolution was not an establishment violation, because such a finding
would have been fatal to the mandatory presentation of evolution theory then practiced.
But that concern was not the issue upon which the Court focused. 393 U.S. at 103. Several lower courts have found no establishment violation in the presentation of evolution.
See, e.g., McLean v. Arkansas Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255, 1274 (E.D. Ark.
1982)(teaching the theory of evolution); accord Wright v. Houston lndep. School Dist.,
366 F. Supp. 1208 (S.D. Tex. 1972), aff'd per curiam, 486 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 417 U.S. 969 (1974); Crowley v. Smithsonian Inst., 636 F.2d 738 (1980)(museum
exhibit concerning evolution); Willoughby v. Stever, No. 1574-72 (D.D.C. May 18,
1973)(National Science Foundation funding for textbooks teaching evolution), aff'd
mem., 504 F.2d 271 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 297 (1975). See generally
Goldberg, supra note 26, at 28.
34. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980)(per curiam)(posting Ten Commandments);
Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968)(banning evolution); School Dist. v. Schempp,
374 U.S. 203 (1968)(classroom prayer).
35. Secular purpose is a somewhat misleading category. What the Court actually
means is that a significant religious or sectarian purpose will be fatal, regardless of possible secular justifications for the act; the Court is looking for religious purposes which
invalidate the act, not secular purposes which might save it. See, e.g., School Dist. v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 224-25 (1963)(although Bible study has a possible secular purpose, the presence of a religious purpose is fatal).
36. See McLean v. Arkansas Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255 (E.D. Ark. 1982)(holding unconstitutional the Arkansas Balanced Treatment Act). The Arkansas act included
a carefully worded preamble of secular purposes:
Legislative Declaration of Purpose. This Legislature enacts this Act for public
schools with the purpose of protecting academic freedom for students' differing
values and beliefs; ensuring neutrality toward students' diverse religious convictions; ensuring freedom of religious exercise for students and their parents; guaranteeing freedom of belief and speech for students; preventing establishment of
Theologically Liberal, Humanist, Nontheist or Atheist religions; preventing discrimination against students on the basis of their personal beliefs concerning
creation and evolution; and assisting students in their search for the truth. This
Legislature does not have the purpose of causing instruction in religious concepts or making an establishment of religion.
Arkansas Balanced Treatment Act, ARK. STAT. ANN. § 80-1668 (1981 Supp.)(emphasis
added); cf. Balanced Treatment for Creation-Science and Evolution-Science Act, LA.
REv." STAT. ANN. § 17:286.2 (West Supp. 1982) (stating simply that the Act is "enacted
for the purpose of protecting academic freedom").
37. 449 U.S. 39 (1980)(per curiam).
38. Id. at 41. See Comment, Stone v. Graham: A Fragile Defense of Individual Religious Autonomy, 69 Kv. L.J. 392, 401 (1980-1981)(noting that the Court ignored a number of secular purposes on the face of the statute). Until Stone it was thought that pur-
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courts will ignore statutory statements of secular purpose where
they are mere shams.
Many creationists argue that the state has a nonsecular purpose in teaching the theory of evolution. Their arguments take
two forms. First, they reason that evolutionary theory is a religion; consequently, mandating instruction in evolution has a religious purpose. 89 Second, they argue that, even assuming evolution is not a religion, the motivation of evolution's proponents is
to advance or inhibit some evolution-based religion.'' 0 Neither
argument, however, survives close scrutiny.
a. The theory of evolution is not an establishment-religionIn order to protect establishment clause values without excessively limiting government actions, "establishment-religion"
should be defined narrowly. 41 Commentators suggest that an espose could be judged only from the act's stated purpose. Because that could easily be
made secular, though, the purpose test was considered perfunctory. See L. TRIBE, AMERI·
CAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14-8, at 836 (1978)("the Court will usually find in the statutory language or elsewhere a secular purpose [and) then move on"); Comment, A Workable Definition of the Establishment Clause: Allen v. Morton Raises New Questions, 62
GEO. L.J. 1461, 1464-65 (1974)(the presence of "a singular primary secular goal" is adequate to save an act regardless of any sectarian purpose present).
39. See, e.g., Crowley v. Smithsonian Inst., 636 F.2d 738, 740 (1980)(museum displays
on evolution alleged to violate the establishment clause by promoting the religion of Secular Humanism); Wright v. Houston Indep. School Dist., 366 F. Supp. 1208, 1209
(1972)(public school presentation of evolution theory alleged to be religious), alf'd per
curiam, 486 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 969 (1974); Arkansas Balanced Treatment Act, ARK. STAT. ANN. § 80-1669(0 (1981 Supp.)(public school presentation of evolution "produces hostility toward many Theistic religions and brings preference to [Nontheistic religions which) include a religious belief in evolution"); H. MORRIS,
supra note 12, at 172 (evolution is "fundamentally a religion, rather than a science").
Mr. Morris expands on this point elsewhere:
Evolution is, in fact, a religious belief in [a broad] sense, and so is atheism. In
fact, there is one very cogent reason why creationists object to the exclusive
teaching of evolution in the schools, since in effect this amounts to indoctrinating young people in a particular religion, with its own system of ethics and values and ultimate meanings.
SCIENTIFIC CREATIONISM, supra note 14, at 196.
40. See, e.g., H. MORRIS, supra note 12, at 37-40.
41. A different case holds under the free exercise clause where constitutional values
mandate a broad definition of religion, affording complainants the right to define religion
in their own terms. See, e.g., Thomas v. Review Bd., Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450
U.S. 707, 715 (1981)(complainant "drew a line, and it is not for us to say that the line he
drew was an unreasonable one"). If the free exercise definition were the establishment
clause standard, however, almost any governmental act which advanced or inhibited that
"religion" as defined by the complainant could trigger a violation, no matter how bizarre
the claim might be.
If religion need not be predicated on a belief in God or even in a god and if it
may not be tested by the common consensus of what reasonable men would reasonably call religion, if it is so private that - so long as it does not inflict injury
on society - it is immured from governmental interference and from judicial
inquiry, [might] not a group of gymnasts proclaiming on their trampolines that
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tablishment-religion is religion according to the "man on the
street."42 A broader definition might implicate many secular
physical culture is their religion be engaged in a religious exercise?
Manning, The Douglas Concept of God in Government, 39 WASH. L. REV. 47, 63 (1964).
Under such a broad definition congressional appropriations to help these gymnasts "pursue their cult" by going to the Olympics might establish religion. Id. at 66. A similar
concern was posed by Professor Kauper when he noted that Communism, "with its discipline, its cultus, its sense of community, and its obligation to duties owing the system"
has a clear resemblance to religion. P. KAUPER, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION 31
(1964); cf. Note, Transcendental Meditation and the Meaning of Religion Under the
Establishment Clause, 62 MINN. L. REv. 887, 909 (1978)(conceding that Marxism resembles religion, but distinguishing it from establishment-religions on the grounds that
Marxism is not as "comprehensive" as establishment-religion and does not lay claim to
"ultimate truth") [hereinafter cited as Note, Transcendental Meditation]. Even the ideology of democracy, at least for some who espouse it with almost religious passion, might
qualify as a religion under the free exercise standard. P. KAUPER, supra, at 31. And if
promoting democracy has a religious purpose, government itself would establish religion.
Cf. Note, Toward a Constitutional Definition of Religion, 91 HARV. L. REv. 1056, 108384 (1978)(a broad definition of religion for establishment clause purposes "could lead to
hopelessly intricate and expensive restrictions on the state's capacity to take action")
[hereinafter cited as Note, Constitutional Definition]; see also Comment, Religious Activity in Public Schools: A Proposed Standard, 24 ST. LOUIS U.L.J. 379, 389 (1980)[hereinafter cited as Comment, Religious Activity]; Comment, Teaching Transcendental
Meditation in Public Schools: Defining Religion for Establishment Purposes, 16 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 325, 340 (1979)(broad functional definition of religion in establishment
clause litigation would "paralyze governmental action in the broad areas of public health,
welfare, safety, and morals")[hereinafter cited as Comment, Defining Religion]. See generally L. TRIBE, supra note 38, § 14-8, at 835-36.
The sometimes competing values of the two religion clauses create a certain amount of
tension. See Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 788 (1973); J. NOWAK,
R. ROTUNDA & J. YouNG, supra note 22, at 849; Choper, supra· note 25, at 674. This
conflict at the intersection of the religion clauses has prompted some commentators to
look for the more "fundamental" of the two, see, e.g., Moore, The Supreme Court and
the Relationship Between the "Establishment" and "Free Exercise" Clauses, 42 TEx. L.
REV. 142, 179 (1963)(establishment clause was designed to help implement the free exercise clause), while others attempt to reconcile the clauses, see, e.g., Schwarz, supra note
31, at 693; Note, supra note 9, at 543. Such attempts have proven difficult, and judicial
attempts at reconciliation have produced disparate results. See, e.g., Everson v. Board of
Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947)(strict separation); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306
(1952)(accommodation); School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963)(neutrality).
See generally Buchanan, Accommodation of Religion in the Public Schools: A Plea for
Careful Balancing of Competing Constitutional Values, 28 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1000, 100111 (1981). Part of this difficulty stems from the lack of any indication that either clause
was intended to dominate the other. See Pfeffer, Freedom and/or Separation: The Constitutional Dilemma of the First Amendment, 64 MINN. L. REv. 561, 568-69 (1980).
The best way to ameliorate this tension is to define "religion" differently under each
clause. This approach has been criticized because the word "religion" is used only once
in the first amendment, perhaps implying but one definition. See, e.g., Everson v. Board
of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 32 (1947)(Rutledge, J., dissenting). Nevertheless, a bifurcated definition of religion is indispensable in resolving the conflict between free exercise and establishment. Note, Constitutional Definition, supra, at 1085 & n.138; see infra notes 9193 and accompanying text.
42. See, e.g., Galanter, Religious Freedom in the United States: A Turning Point?,
1966 Wis. L. REV. 217, 266-67 (For purposes of the establishment clause the "effect and
purpose of government action are not to be assessed by the religious sensibilities of the
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government actions not generally considered religious or irreligious. At the very least, this narrow establishment standard
would encompass all religions professing purportedly absolute
truths and a general belief in a transcendent reality. 0
Under this definition, evolutionary theory does not qualify as
religion. Evolutionary theory, like all scientific theories, presupposes neither the existence nor absence of a transcendent being
and makes no claim to absolute truths. 44 The evolution of species may be guided by the hand of God or by the workings of a
godless mechanistic universe, but evolutionary theory has nothing to say about this issue. 0 Although evolutionary theory, like
person who is complaining of the alleged establishment. It must be essentially religious
in some widely shared public understanding.").
43. Several commentators have attempted to define religion for purposes of the religi_on clauses. See, e.g., Pepper, Reynolds, Yoder, and Beyond: Alternatives for the Free
Exercise Clause, 1981 UTAH L. REv. 309, 355-64 (defining the parameters of free exercise
religion); Note, Transcendental Meditation, supra note 41, at 905 (defining religion for
establishment purposes). The elements common to most of these definitions include
claims of immutable, absolute truths, and belief in a transcendent reality. There are, of
course, other elements which many see as religious, such as institutionalization and symbolic trappings. See, e.g., id. But absolute truths and a transcendent reality are at the
core.
44. Some claim that the astrogeophysical theory of the "big bang," the theory that
the entire universe has extruded from a single massive explosion of super-dense matter,
is an attempt by scientists to "explain" the origin of all matter and life, thus denying the
existence of God. See, e.g., J. MooRE, supra note 11, at 62 (quoting Colossians 2:8).
Creationists correctly recognize, however, that science does not account for the original
super-dense state. SCIENTIFIC CREATIONISM, supra note 14, at 28. Nor will science ever so
account, for that is the realm of philosophy and religion. See A. VAN MELSEN, EVOLUTION
AND PHILOSOPHY 150 (1965); G. SIMPSON, THE MEANING OF EVOLUTION 279 (rev. ed. 1967).
Darwin himself realized that his theory did not answer that question: "[I] feel compelled
to look for a First Cause [but the] mystery of the beginning of all things is insoluble by
us." C. DARWIN, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF CHARLES DARWIN AND SELECTED LETTERS 66 (F.
Darwin ed. 1958).
Misapprehension that the theory of evolution explains the origin of the universe may
stem from confusing the origin of the universe with the origin of life. Even Darwin could
not foresee that, given the initial matter of the universe, evolutionary theory would be
adequate to explain the resultant emergence of life from nonlife. See id. at 272 ("It is
mere rubbish, thinking at present of the origin of life; one might as well think of the
origin of matter."). Since Darwin's day, however, scientists have devised a now well-accepted mechanism by which life could originate out of the nonlife believed to exist billions of years past - the Oparin-Haldane theory. See LIFE ON EARTH, supra note 8, at
503-21 (evolving organic molecules led to even more complex clusters, eventually to proteins, and ultimately to simple self-replicating "life forms"); see also A. LEHNINGER, BIOCHEMISTRY 1031-55 (2d ed. 1975)(detailing the biochemical processes which predated the
first "life" forms). For an example of contemporary research into prebiotic ("before life")
evolution, see Eigen, Gardiner, Schuster & Winkler-Oswatitsch, The Origin of Genetic
Information, Sc,. AM., Apr. 1981, at 88 (using experiments with bacterial viruses, as well
as studies of the components of proteins and nucleic acids, to construct inductively a
theory of prebiotic evolution)[hereinafter cited as Eigen].
45. Mayer, The Nineteenth Century Revisited, BSCS NEWSLETTER, Nov. 1972, at 12
(quoted in Note, supra note 9, at 519 n.20) ("[s]cience is neutral with regard to the
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some religions, attempts to explain certain features of the world,
the two use radically different epistemologies. Because the theory of evolution takes no stance on the issue of a supreme being's existence, it does not - and cannot - explain empirical
data by reference to a transcendent reality.' 6 Instead, it applies
the scientific method'7 to postulate a natural principle of species
development. Conversely, those religions which purport to explain the presence of life - especially human life - customarily
rely on a transcendent being. Religion and evolutionary theory
are thus sharply distinguishable.
Evolutionary theory is based on observation and analysis of
data and experimentation. Some, however, have taken issue with
this claim, arguing that evolution cannot be experimentally obtheological implications arising out of scientific investigation"). Science is only a technique, a neutral tool with which to analyze data in the natural world. The uses to which
that tool is applied, however, are not always neutral. A classic example is Social Darwinism, which used Darwin's phrase "survival of the fittest" to justify the distribution of
wealth and political power in the world. See R. HOFSTADTER, Soc1AL DARWINISM IN AMERICAN THOUGHT 5-6 (rev. ed. 1959). Such aberrant uses of science prompt some to claim
that science in general - and evolution theory in particular - is a value system based
on atheism. See infra notes 48-62 and accompanying text. This completely confuses the
theory of evolution with the ends to which it may be applied, for science cannot address
ultimate values: "[Science] can never even approach the answer to the last questions:
'Why is there a world at all rather than nothing?' and 'why is the world such as it is and
not different?' " Baier, The Meaning of Life: Christianity Versus Science, in PHILOSOPHY FOR A NEW GENERATION 656 (3d ed. 1977).
46. See Resolution, National Academy of Sciences, Oct. 17, 1972,paraphrased in Le
Clercq, supra note 9, at 219 (the basic precepts of natural science exclude resorting to
supernatural causes because there are no objective criteria by which to validate them).
Nevertheless, some have argued that because the theory of evolution postulates a "design" in nature, it presupposes a "designer." See Note, supra note 9, at 557 n.209. Evolutionary theory's "design," however, merely sets forth the functional relationships among
species; it does not presuppose that some being ordered the development of life. Teleology in the world of the natural scientist means merely search for design in nature as
evidence of the interrelation of species and natural order. See Aulie, The Doctrine of
Special Creation, 34 AM. BIOLOGY TCHR. 191, 196 (1972)(explaining how biologists research design to "determine the material connections among contingent events"); see
also LIFE ON EARTH, supra note 8, at 631.
47. The scientific method is applied to sensate data (empirical data collected from
the natural world) from which scientists hypothesize theories to correlate the known empirical data with a minimum of contradictions or internal inconsistencies. See, e.g., BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES CURRICULUM STUDY, BIOLOGICAL SCIENCE: MOLECULES TO MAN 14-21
(rev. ed. 1968); Baier, supra note 45, at 652, 654; Lederberg, The Freedoms and the
Control of ·Science: Notes from the Iuory Tower, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 596, 599 (1!}72).
When new empirical data come to light the theory is reexamined and, if necessary, revised. The McLean court pieced together a definition of science which further explains
this epistemology: (1) it is guided by natural law; (2) it must be explanatory by reference
only to natural laws; (3) it is testable against the known empirical data; (4) its conclusions are tentative and subject to change with increased understanding and more coherent explanations;· (5) it is falsifiable, that is, logically rigorous and not dependent on
axioms or postulates which cannot themselves be proven by reference to natural law: See
McLean v. Arkansas Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255, 1267 (E.D. Ark. 1982).
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served or fully verified' 8 and "is as religious as creation. " 49 These
skeptics contend that no single demonstrable macroevolutionary
experiment has ever been successfully performed. 60 But there is
evidence for several demonstrable speciations, 61 as well as evidence of how life originally formed on earth. 62 Critics further
contend that even if evolutionary experiments could reproduce
life, that would not prove that present life formed in that fashion, but only that it could have. 63 They assert that residual evidence - as opposed to direct observation - is inadequate for
scientific purposes. 64 Yet many rigorous scientific theories were
derived long before direct observation became possible,66 or from
data collected long after the analyzed event. 66 Scientists hope to
show only that evolution is one feasible mechanism for the development of life on earth. The theory of evolution will not be
considered a fact, or a "law of science," until the evidence is sufficient to convince the scientific community that no feasible al48. See, e.g., Arkansas Balanced Treatment Act, ARK. STAT. ANN. § 80-1669(c) (1981
Supp.); $cIENTIFIC CREATIONISM, supra note 14, at 4-8. See generally Bird, Freedom from
Establishment Unneutrality in Public School Instruction and Religious School Regulation, 2 HARV. J.L. & Pus. PoL. 125, 198-99 (1979); Note, supra note 9, at 557 n.209. One
explanation for this confusion is the variety of ideas encompassed by the terms "evolution" or "origins." While the origin of the universe is beyond science, the origin of life, of
differing species, and of man are eminently subject to scientific analysis. See supra note
44.
49. H. Morris, Introducing Scientific Creationism into the Public Schools 1 (Institute
for Creation Research 1975), cited in Note, supra note 9, at 557 n.209.
50. See, e.g., SCIENTIFIC CREATIONISM, supra note 14, at 6-7 (claiming that species
origination takes too long to be observed by scientists).
51. Scientists point out that new species have been created "in the laboratory and in
the experimental garden." LIFE ON EARTH, supra note 8, at 635.
52. See Eigen, supra note 44, at 88.
53. See, e.g., L. THURMAN, supra note 8, at 99; cf. BIOLOGY: A SEARCH FOR ORDER IN
COMPLEXITY 455 J. Moore & J. Slusher (rev. ed. 1974)(scientists may synthesize life but
they can never create it).
54. See J. MooRE, supra note 11, at 22.
55. One recent commentary on the origins of life states:
Fragmentary information . . . has never been a barrier to tlie discovery of
laws of nature. Newton discovered tlie universal laws of motion from observations of a few planets; Mendeleev discovered tlie structure of the periodic table
in the chemistry of only a few elements . . . . One does not need a detailed
history of prebioti conditions and events in order to discover tlie evolutionary
laws that led to the first life on the earth.
Eigen, supra note 44, at 88.
56. The demand for actual observability of the first events of evolutionary development is, of course, impossible to fulfill, for by hypothesis no observer was then present.
This argument, however, misapprehends the inferential nature of scientific research. A
scientist who sees a burned-out forest with slight recent growth, though perhaps unable
to ascertain the "first cause" of the fire, can validly infer that there was in fact a fire. By
the same token, residual evidence of early civilizations provides evidence for anthropological science. The same technique can be applied to the residual fossil and geological
evidence employed by evolution's researchers.
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ternative exists, as occurred with the theory, now accepted fact,
of heliocentricity. 117
Evolution, though comprehensive, propounds no absolute
truths which induce religious beliefs. 118 Because it is based on
empirical analysis, evolution may be discredited by substantial
falsifying data. 69 Religious postulates, in contrast, often derived
from scripture or revelation, attest to absolute truths: they cannot be modified or abandoned in light of new data. 80 Thus, a
religious proposition, unlike the theory of evolution, is neither
based on nor modifiable by empirical data.
Evolutionary theory, therefore, is not an "establishment-religion." In this respect, a government directive to teach the doctrine has no religious purpose. Nevertheless, persons may put a
secular subject to the service of a religious end. Government
mandates to teach evolutionary principles have not been immune from this criticism.
b. Evolution's promoters are not religiously or irreligiously
motivated- Some argue that the proponents of evolutionary
theory are motivated by a desire to discredit religious explanations of the origin of human life. 81 They reason that the promo57. A useful comparison can be drawn beween the theories of evolution and relativity, and the well-accepted fact of heliocentricity. Like relativity and evolution, heliocentricity was unpopular when first proposed. See D. STIMSON, THE GRADUAL ACCEPTANCE OP
THE COPERNICAN THEORY OP THE UNIVERSE 71-84 (1917). Religiously motivated opponents
tried to suppress the idea that the earth - and thus man - was not at the center of the
universe. Id. Nevertheless, careful scientific measurement and increasingly sohisticated
telescopes proved what Galileo and Copernicus already knew, and the· "theory" of heJiocentricity became established fact. Id. at 85-94. A similar process is at work with Einstein's theory of relativity, but controversy remains with respect to its certainty. See
N.Y. Times, May 27, 1982, at A13, col. 1. The theory of evolution is at a similar juncture.
See N.Y. Times, Apr. 20, 1982, at 22, col. 1 (midw. ed.).
58. See Note, Transcendental Meditation, supra note 41, at 901.
59. "There is not a reputable biologist alive who would not jettison the evolution
theory were a better scientific theory postulated concerning evolution." Mayer, Merrill,
Ost, Stebbins & Welch, Statements by Scientists in the California Textbook Dispute, 34
AM. BIOLOGY TcHR. 411, 412 (1972)(quoting William v. Mayer) [hereinafter cited as
Mayer]. Darwin himself recognized that falsification techniques exist: "H it could be
demonstrated that any complex organ existed, which could not possibly have been
formed by numerous, successive, slight modifications, my theory would absolutely break
down." C. DARWIN, THE ORIGIN OP SPECIES 135 (Modem Library ed.) (1st ed. 1859). "Hit
could be proved that any part of the structure of any one species had been formed for
the exclusive good of another species, it would annihilate my theory, for such could not
have been produced through natural selection." Id. at 148. See generally Alexander,
Evolution, Creation, and Biology Teaching, 40 AM. BIOLOGY TcHR. 91, 102-03 (1978).
60. See McLean v. Arkansas Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255, 1269 (E.D. Ark. 1982).
61. See id. at 1261 ("I view this whole battle
one between God and anti-God
forces. . .")(quoting drafter of the Arkansas Balanced Treatment Act). Creationists see
"evolutionists" as a pervasive threat to American life, out to destroy the fabric of society:
[T]he theory of evolution is the philosophical foundation for all secular thought
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tion of evolutionary theory is so motivated because it contradicts
the biblical account of Creation. 62 Despite this contradiction,
however, it does not follow that individuals promote evolutionary theory in order to discredit Creation. 68 Rather, they disseminate the theory out of devotion to rigorous empirical analysis analysis which supports the theory of evolution.64 Accordingly,
they are prepared to switch their allegiance as soon as the evidence suggests a different and improved explanation. 86 Instruction in evolutionary theory, therefore, is not intended to refute
the Bible, but rather to extend empirical analysis and explanations into the origin and development of life on earth. 66
While teaching the theory of evolution easily passes the secular purpose test, there remains an even stronger ground for finding evolution constitutionally acceptable: the primary effects
test. This test does not rely on the difficult-to-show subjective
intent of state officials, but rather on the actual effects of the
state action.
2. Primary effects- State action may not have more than "a
remote and incidental effect advantageous to religious institutions."67 Even if a primary secular effect can be found, the state
action is constitutionally barred if there remains any "direct and
immediate effect" advancing or inhibiting religion. 68 In contrast,
today, from education to biology and from psychology through the social sciences. It is the platform from which socialism, communism, humanism, determinism, and one-worldism have been launched . . . . Accepting man as animal,
its advocates endorse animalistic behavior such as free love, situation ethics,
drugs, divorce, abortion and a host of other ideas that contribute to men's present futility and despair.
LaHaye, Introduction to H. MORRIS, supra note 12, at 5; see also McLean, 529 F. Supp.
at 1260 (citing H. MORRIS & CLARK, THE BIBLE HAS THE ANSWER); Titus, God, Evolution,
Legal Education and Law, 1980 J. CHRISTIAN JURISPRUDENCE 11, 37-38, 43.
62. SCIENTIFIC CREATIONISM, supra note 14, at 215.
63. Creationists claim that the science community is "close-minded" on the subject
of creationism. See McLean, 529 F.Supp. at 1268. But see id. ("It is ... inconceivable
that such a loose knit group of independent thinkers in all the varied fields of science
could, or would, so effectively censor new scientific thought.").
64. Scientists constantly discuss and reevaluate the theory of evolution. See, e.g.,
Reseach News, Evolutionary Theory Under Fire, 210 SCIENCE 883 (1980)(reporting on
recent conference which explored the problems with the theory of evolution, as well as
various proposed solutions to answer those problems); N.Y. Times, Apr. 20, 1982, at 22,
col. 1 (midw. ed.)(noting the continuing controversy between evolutionary scientists).
65. See supra note 59.
66. See Hurd, Bybee, Kahle & Yager, Biology Education in Secondary Schools of the
United States, 42 AM. BIOLOGY TCHR. 389, 391 (1980)[hereinafter cited as Hurd].
67. Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 783 n.39 (1973).
68. Id. (finding some legitimate end under the state's police power does not immunize the statute "from further examination to ascertain whether it also has the direct
and immediate effect of advancing religion"). See generally Note, supra note 26, at 1162
n.114.
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state action which merely harmonizes with the tenets of an establishment-religion does not run afoul of the first amendment.69
The teaching of evolution theory has been said to advance secular humanism, atheism, and nontheism. 70 The theory of evolution does harmonize with the tenets of certain splinter religions
like Secular Humanism, but that is an incidental and unintended effect. 71 The primary effect of teaching evolution is the
fortification of scientific analysis, not the advancement of any
harmonizing religion. 72
Just as governmental action may not have the primary effect
69. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 445-48 (1961)(although Sunday closing
laws may at one· time have been religiously motivated, that impermissible purpose has
dissipated, and the law now merely harmonizes with Sunday-off religions); School Dist.
v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 303 (1963)(Brennan, J., concurring)(murder laws that accord
with religious tenets do not establish religion). One commentator has proposed the following test to determine whether the actual or intended primary effects are secular:
"Would the legislature have acted as it did were there no interdependency with religion
involved? If so, then I think it would be fair to say that there is no subsidy of religion,
that the religious benefits are constitutionally permitted side effects." Sugarman, New
Perspectives on "Aid" to Private School Users, in NONPUBLIC SCHOOL Am 64, 66 (E.
West ed. 1976).
The cases have never succeeded in refining this standard, but have relied instead on ad
hoc factual determinations. Consequently, the standard is much simpler to state than to
apply. For instance, religious material intended to be used for its religious value has
always been banned, see Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (per curiam) (posting Ten
Commandments); School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963)(Bible study), but even
Schempp suggests in dictum that a comparative religion course which employed the Bible for secular study would be allowed, id. at 225. Yet, the "mere possibility" that religious groups "might" use a federally financed building in 20 years was justification
enough to halt funding in Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971). See Committee for
Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 783 n.39 (1973).
At some point the connection with religion becomes so tenuous that, though the government act technically "aids" religion by relieving certain financial obligations, it is not
considered aid to religion. One example is provision of police and fire protection to parochial schools. See supra text accompanying notes 26-30. See generally L. TRmE, supra
note 38, at § 14-9; P. KAUPER, supra note 41, at 108.
70. See supra notes 39 & 48-62; cf. Arkansas Balanced Treatment Act, ARK. STAT.
ANN. § 80-1669(0 (1981 Supp.)(public school presentation of evolution "brings preference to Theological Liberalism, Humanism, Non-theistic religions and Atheism").
71. Such an incidental and unintended effect does not violate the establishment
clause. See, e.g., Crowley v. Smithsonian Inst., 636 F.2d 738, 742-43 (D.C. Cir. 1980)(advancing Secular Humanism via museum displays on evolution is not prohibited due to
incidental, unintended effect); Willoughby v. Stever, No. 1574-72 (D.D.C. May 18,
1973)(textbook on evolution only incidentally affects religion), aff'd mem., 504 F.2d 271
(D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 927 (1975); see also Recent Developments, supra
note 2, at 1059-60 (such an argument "fails to distinguish secular humanism, as the term
is used to describe our culture and institutions, and secular humanism as a philosophy
or, according to the [Supreme Court,] a religion which holds that God is essentially irrelevant to man").
72. See Crowley v. Smithsonian Inst., 636 F.2d 738, 741 (D.C. Cir. 1980); see also
Wright v. Houston Indep. School Dist., 366 F. Supp. 1208, 1211 (S.D. Tex. 1972), aff'd
per curiam, 486 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 969 (1974).
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of advancing religions, the establishment clause prohibits governmental hostility or opposition toward religion. 73 To remain
neutral, the state must support only nonreligious or secular effects; it cannot favor one religious or irreligious view over another. 7" Some claim that teaching evolution has antireligious effects. They point to its indoctrination in factsn that effectively
leave the student no room to believe in supernatural or religious
explanations. 76 But evolutionary theory is not presented as indisputable dogma by the scientific community. 77 It is a malleable
theory, subject to modification. 78 It attempts to correlate logically a catalog of empirical data into a cogent whole. 79 If another
theory were to explain more data than evolutionary theory, that
new theory would take hold in the scientific community. 80 No
such alternative, however, has been posited. 81 If teaching the
most credible and unifying theories were considered to be an establishment violation whenever such scientific evidence contra73. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971); School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S.
203, 222 (1963).
74. See supra note 31.
75. See Note, supra note 9, at 537 n.105 (evolution is taught in such a way as to
"signify something tantamount to fact"); cf. L. THURMAN, supra note 8, at 42 (when
evolutionists call evolution a fact, they mean microevolution, when calling it a theory,
they mean macroevolution).
76. See, e.g., Bird, supra note 48, at 203-04 (arguing that exclusive presentation of
evolution impairs religious beliefs).
77. At least one college biology text is careful to note that evolution is a tentative
theory. See LIFE ON EARTH, supra note 8, at 521; see also B. CAMPBELL, HUMAN EVOLUTION 1 (2d ed. 1974). This perception of "factual indoctrination" may stem from the
sometimes unqualified presentation of evolution theory, but is more likely a result of the
striking strength of evolution as a unifying theory of biology. Scientists do not want to
imply that evolution is simply "an envisaged possibility, something uncertain and unproved." Note, supra note 9, at 537 n.105 (quoting E. KLINCKMANN, BIOLOGY TEACHERS'
HANDBOOK 16 (2d ed. 1970)). It is evolution theory's ability to explain a great deal of
biology that prompts occasional overstatements by scientists to the effect that it is a fact.
See infra note 79.
78. See, e.g., Research News, supra note 64 (reporting conference on improving evolutionary explanations); Eigen, supra note 44, at 88 (explaining new developments in
prebiotic explanations of evolution); Hodge, The Andromeda Galaxy, Sci. AM., Jan.
1981, at 92 (explaining how distant galaxies can be used as "laboratories" for the study
of the evolution of stars and galaxies); Wetherill, The Formation of the Earth from
Planetesimals, Sc,. AM., June 1981, at 162 (presenting a theory on the accretion of planetary mass which resulted in planets like the earth); Woese, Archaebacteria, id. at 98
(discussing the evolution of cellular structure ·and function).
79. See, e.g., LIFE ON EARTH, supra note 8, at 635 ("the modem version of Darwinism
has been aligned so consistently with genetics, paleontology, systematics, and other
branches of biology, that it must be regarded as one of the most firmly grounded and
reliable explanatory systems in all science"); Le Clercq, supra note 9, at 236 ("The usefulness of the theory of evolution to explain and to organize empirical data cannot seriously be questioned.").
80. See supra note 59.
81. See LIFE ON EARTH, supra note 8, at 653.
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dieted some religious belief, science learning would be seriously
impaired.
Moreover, even if instruction in evolution inhibits creationist
religions, it does so only in an incidental manner. The primary
effect of teaching evolution is not repression of creationist religions, but enhanced knowledge of the scientific method. Teaching evolution imparts a cogent empirical explanation of the origins and development of life on earth. Such instruction
encourages skepticism of all scientific theories in order to maintain the vigor of scientific investigation. This scientific skepticism may lead students to question nonnatural explanations as
well; but any skepticism of religious beliefs is only an incidental
by-product of scientific study and has never been the subject of
establishment proscription. 82
3. Entanglement- The prohibition against entanglement
mandates that government not intrude pervasively into the religious arena, or vice versa. 83 It is designed to minimize the divisiveness that often accompanies state interference in religious
controversy, whether fiscal or doctrinal, and religious involvement in state concerns. 84 This branch of the test, however, is
relatively unimportant once the purpose and primary effect tests
are met, and is normally applied only in cases involving financial
support for religion. 811 In fact, evolution's entanglement with religion arises only when critics inject religion into the debate over
teaching the theory of evolution. 88 There is no divisiveness
among rf:!ligions or doctrinal disputes to be resolved by the
courts, and no state interference with religion or fiscal support
of any establishment-religion. Consequently, the theory of evolution presents no entanglement problem.
82. See generally Goldberg, supra note 26, at 28 (noting that the intermittent tension between religion and science was constitutionally determined in favor of science).
83. See generally Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 620 (1971); Walz v. Tax
Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970); L. TRIBE, supra note 38, § 14-12, at 865.
84. See Note, supra note 26, at 1164-65 n.12 (citing Allen v. Morton, 495 F.2d 65, 74
(D.C. Cir. 1973)).
85. For this reason, some have complained that the entanglement test is superfluous.
See, e.g., Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 769-70 (1976)(White, J., concurring); L. TRIBE, supra note 38, § 14-12, at 865. Others criticize the "political divisiveness"
language. See, e.g., Gaffney, Political Divisiveness Along Religious Lines: The Entanglement of the Court in Sloppy History and Bad Public Policy, 24 ST. Louis U.L.J. 205,
212 (1980). Nonetheless, the test continues to serve as a barrier to excessive governmental intervention, especially in doctrinal disputes, see, e.g., Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595
(1979)(courts may not resolve church property disputes on the basis of religious doctrine
and practice), and governmental involvement in programs concerning religion, see, e.g.,
Larson v. Valente, 102 S. Ct. 1673, 1687 (1982).
86. Crowley v. Smithsonian Inst., 636 F.2d 738, 744 (1980).
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In summary, teaching evolution in the public schools does not
constitute an establishment of religion. This instruction has a
manifest secular purpose, primary secular effects with only incidental religious effects, and no impermissible entanglement. The
next section discusses whether teaching evolution unconstitutionally burdens the public school pupil's free exercise of
religion.

B. Evolution Theory and the Free Exercise Clause
The free exercise clause of the first amendment prohibits the
government from purposefully interfering· with religious beliefs
and practices. 87 The state, therefore, cannot intentionally restrain public school students in their religious beliefs. 88 Such restraint would unconstitutionally burden the student's right to
the free exercise of religion.
In order to make out a free exercise claim, the student or parent must show that first, the belief burdened by the state action
was religious; second, the state burdened that religious belief in
a coercive fashion; and finally, the coercive burden was not outweighed by a countervailing state interest.89 Under this quasibalancing test, 90 the teaching of evolutionary theory does not
87. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)(Seventh-day Adventist who believes in a day of rest on Saturday may not be forced to work on that day to qualify for
unemployment compensation); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961)(oath affirming
belief in God violates atheist belieO.
88. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)(Amish students compelled to
attend school after the eighth grade are wholly unable to practice the separatist beliefs of
their religion); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943)(compulsory flag salute forces student, against his religious conscience, to practice idolatry).
89. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398
(1963); see also Note, supra note 9, at 518.
90. Balancing tests in constitutional determinations are criticized for their ad hoc
flavor, see, e.g., Note, supra note 9, at 539 n.115, while bright-line tests and absolute
rules are often condemned as inflexible or "wooden," Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398,
414 (1963)(Stewart, J., concurring); see also Note, The Free Exercise and Establishment
Clauses: Conflict or Coordination?, 48 MINN. L. REv. 929, 930-933 (1964). The free exercise cases reflect this ambivalence and sometimes sidestep any explicit balancing test.
Compare Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961)(state interest in a uniform day of rest
is more important than the financial loss incurred by Orthodox Jews who are motivated
by religious beliefs to close on Saturdays and barred by the state from opening on Sundays), with Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)(plaintiff's religious belief in Saturday
rest is to be protected over state's desire to condition employment benefits on willingness
to work on Saturdays). But in the end, balancing seems inevitable. See Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)(Amish belief in separatism "overbalances" the admittedly
strong state interest in compulsory education); Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal Development, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1381, 1390 (1967); Le Clercq,
supra note 9, at 227.
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unconstitutionally burden the free exercise of beliefs held by
most Biblical Creationists.
1. Religious belief- In cases involving the establishment
clause, "religion" must be defined narrowly to allow the government freedom to act. 91 In free exercise cases, however, the Supreme Court gives great weight to the believer's own characterization of the belief as religious;99 the principal judicial inquiry is
whether the individual's belief occupies a meaningful place in
his or her life " 'parallel to that filled [by] God' in traditionally
religious persons. " 93
This broad definition for "free-exercise-religion," hinging as it
does on subjective belief, embraces easily the beliefs of Biblical
Creationists for Biblical Creationists proclaim emphatically the
religious character of their beliefs. Specifically, they believe that
the literal account of Genesis is true and that the Bible is inerrant. 94 Beliefs rooted in such a traditional religious text clearly
fall within the ambit of the free exercise clause. 911
2. Coercive burden- State action which interferes in any
way with an individual's freedom to pursue a free-exercise-religion is technically burdensome." To be unconstitutional, how91. See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
92. See, e.g., Thomas v. Review Bd., Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 714
(1981); Galanter, supra note 42, at 266-67; Note, supra note 9, at 519 n.19; cf. Weiss,
Privilege, Posture and Protection - "Religion in the Law", 73 YALE L.J. 593, 604
(1964)(any attempt by a court to define religion "would seem to violate religious freedom
in that it would dictate to religions, present and future what they must be").
93. Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 339 (1970)(quoting United States v. Seeger,
380 U.S. 163, 176 (1965)). While these cases turned on statutory interpretations, they
provide insight into the Court's view of religion in free-exercise-type cases:
[A]ny sincere belief based on a power, being, or faith, upon which all else is
ultimately dependent, could qualify as a religious belief or training. The Court
avoided a theistic interpretation of religion and adopted a broader, more liberal
standard, which focuses on the role that set of beliefs serves for an individual.
Comment, Religious Activity, supra note 41, at 388 (footnotes omitted). While the standard is indeed a liberal one, the Court has not yet overruled its dictum in Wisconsin v.
Yoder that mere "philosophical and personal" belief has no constitutional status. 406
U.S. 205, 216 (1972).
94. See Note, supra note 9, at 519-20.
95. See Thomas v. Review Bd., Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 715
(198l)("Thomas drew a line, and it is not for us to say that the line he drew was an
unreasonable one."). Indeed, Fundamentalism qualifies easily under the more stringent
standard for establishment-religion. See supra note 43. Fundamentalists are theistic, believe in a transcendent reality, propound absolute truths, and are well organized and well
established historically. See generally Note, supra note 9, at 519-20 (citing the Articles
of Faith for several creationist and Fundamentalist religions, including Seventh-day Adventists Apostolic Lutherans, Independent Baptists, and others).
96. See Note, supra note 9, at 523-33 (outlining an extensive array of possible "burdens" in the public school, including exposure to contrary beliefs and even peer
pressure).

442

Journal of Law Reform

[VOL. 15:2

ever, the burden must be direct and coercive. 97 Furthermore,
merely being compelled to take certain actions will not sustain a
first amendment challenge if there is no resulting coercion of beliefs, for only beliefs mandate absolute protection. 98
Biblical Creationists claim that the compulsory setting of the
classroom, the mandatory training in evolution theory, and the
absence of a counterbalancing model of creation combine to
place a coercive burden on the free exercise of their religious beliefs. 99 Certainly there is a coercive aspect to compulsory class97. See, e.g., Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961)(upholding state act which did
not force the complainant to abandon his religion, but merely made the exercise of his
beliefs more expensive). A direct burden involves an irreconcilable conflict between the
individual's religious tenets and obedience to the law, necessitating "either abandoning
his religious practice or facing criminal prosecution." Id. at 605. In contrast, an indirect
burden is imposed by an act "which does not make unlawful the religious practice itself,"
but places only an incidental, e.g., economic, hardship on the activity. Id. at 606; see
Note, A Braunfeld v. Brown Test for Indirect Burdens on the Free Exercise of Religion,
48 MINN. L. REV. 1165, 1166 (1964).
The Court has softened the direct burden test to include compelled abandonment of
belief in order to receive a public benefit. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963).
The test of "abandoning a religious practice," however, has been retained. The abandonment showing is relatively high, and mere postponement in time or limited narrowing of
opportunities to exercise religious beliefs would probably be considered indirect. In the
case of creationist students complaining about evolution theory as a burden, the "compelled abandonment of belier• showing is difficult to make. See infra note 101.
98. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-304 (1940)("[T]he [First] Amendment embraces two concepts - freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute, but in the nature of things, the second cannot be."); cf. Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, § 701(j), 42 U.S.C. § 2000-e(j)(1976)(religious observance and practice protected as well as belieO.
99. See, e.g., Note, supra note 9, at 536-38, 541-43. Wendell Bird, the author of the
cited student note, is now staff attorney for the Institute for Creation Research in San
Diego, writing extensively on this subject from a creationist point of view. He is the
author of the article cited supra note 48, as well as a drafter of the Arkansas Balanced
Treatment Act. He has also intervened for the State of Louisiana in the litigation regarding its balanced treatment act, Keith v. Louisiana Dep't of Educ., Civ. Act. 81-989 § B
(M.D. La. filed Dec. 2, 1981); Aguillard v. Treen, Civ. Act. 81-4787 (E.D. La. filed Dec. 3,
1981). See N.Y. Times, Mar. 7, 1982, § 4, at 19, col. 3 (midw. ed.). Mr. Bird claims the
public school setting imposes a variety of restraints on a creationist child: undermining
of creationist beliefs by inducing belief in incompatible views, i.e., evolution; violation of
the separatist practices of creationists, especially religions such as the absolute separatism of Apostolic Lutherans wishing to shun all worldly influences; and compulsion of
unconscionable declarations of belief, e.g., test answers which affirm evolution. See Note,
supra note 9, at 523-26.
Mr. Bird also lists the allegedly coercive aspects of evolutionary instruction: compulsion through course prescription; penalization by unconstitutional condition, i.e., imposing a choice between the free exercise rights and the benefit of public education in evolution classes (It is not clear that this "benefit" is even sought by creationists. See infra
note 203 and accompanying text.); and influence and pressure from teachers and peers.
See id. at 528-36.
Each of these concerns is prompted by the undeniable fact that many creationist students alter their religious beliefs while attending public schools. See id. at 537 n.107
(citing K. HYDE, RELIGIOUS LEARNING IN ADOLESCENCE 44 (1965)). Contrary to Mr. Bird's

WINTER 1982)

Religion Clauses

443

room instruction: the pedagogical process demands discipline
and adherence to taught behavior patterns; the student is pressured to conform class participation and test answers to the
teacher's expectations. Yet this everyday pressure to conform is
not the unconstitutionally coercive burden barred by the free exercise clause, except in cases where religion pervades nearly
every apsect of the student's life. 100 Thus, while students may
find a given course or lesson offensive to their personal tastes or
beliefs, the free exercise clause is not violated unless the entire
setting of public education - the classes, the lessons, the
"worldJiness" - is shown to be burdensome. 101
analysis, however, only the "unconscionable declaration of beliefs" on a test paper might
qualify as a compelled act of affirmance on the part of the creationist student. Even this
act is not equivalent to the wholesale abandonment of a religious tenet, which is the
ultimate concern of the free exercise clause. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398,
404 (1963)("abandoning one of the precepts of her religion"). To suggest otherwise would
lead to the conclusion that test questions concerning the history of the Soviet Union
asked on a history test will induce belief in communism. See infra note 101 and accompanying text.
100. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 236 (19_72).
101. Amish beliefs require members to pursue simple vocational lifestyles such as
farming. In Yoder, the Amish objected to higher education in general because it tended
to emphasize "intellectual and scientific accomplishment, self-distinction, competitiveness, worldly success, and social life with other students." 406 U.S. at 211. Such beliefs
could not be accommodated within the traditional public school. See id. at 218. Wholesale exemption was the only constitutionally acceptable solution.
The Supreme Court's free exercise pronouncements have never extended to mere exposure to ideas contrary to religious belief except in the case of strict separatists like the
Amish. See id. at 211. In Sherbert, the complainant had the choice either to abandon
Saturday worship or be denied state unemployment compensation. 374 U.S. at 404, 406,
410. In Torcaso, the complainant either had to swear to a belief in God or be barred from
elective office. 367 U.S. at 495. In Thomas, petitioner could either abandon his pacifist
religious beliefs or lose state benefits. 450 U.S. at 717. In none of these cases did the
Court suggest that mere exposure to contrary ideas would suffice to prove a free exercise
violation.
The public school cases are somewhat more solicitous of "mere exposure." In Yoder,
the students could either attend a school which contradicted all Amish beliefs or face
legal sanctions. 406 U.S. at 211. In Barnette, the compelled flag salute offered the student the unconstitutional choice of practicing idolatry by affirming belief in a "graven
image," or facing disciplinary measures. 319 U.S. at 633-34. Still, in these cases the student was being asked to profess belief, by word or act, in the contrary idea. This differs
from the classroom pressure on creationists who are asked only to explain on a test paper
about a theory of natural science, and not to profess to a personal belief.
[l]n a science course the student is not forced to believe as true anything which
he studies. If the student cannot accommodate his or her parents' religious views
with the theory of evolution, as most students do, he is free to reject personally
the theory of evolution for whatever reasons he wishes since the right to believe
or think is absolutely protected under the first amendment.
Le Clercq, supra note 9, at 230 n.132; cf. Kalven, supra note 13, at 520 n.39 ("A strong
case can be made that even religious beliefs are strengthened by exposure to c~unterdoctrine. The classical analysis is found in Mill's essay on Liberty where he defended
freedom to argue against belief in Christian ethics and morality on these grpunds.").
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Moreover, merely showing that evolutionary theory exerts an
influence on religious beliefs cannot support a constitutional
complaint. 102 Many school subjects influence religious beliefs or
ethics; sex education, the life sciences, government, literature, as
well as history and comparative religion classes often raise
thorny issues impinging on religious beliefs. 108 This influence,
however, is not considered unconstitutionally coercive. 104
Finally, students exposed to the theory of evolution are
neither forced nor encouraged to abandon religious beliefs. If the
scientific method is properly presented, the student will realize
that science limits itself to analysis of empirical data•oa and
avoids discussion of ultimate values or primary causes.108 Thus
understood, even compelling a test answer on evolutionary theory is not coercive of religious belief, but only a neutral act in
science education.
For the vast majority of creationists, mere exposure to contradictory beliefs is insufficient to demonstrate unconstitutional coercion.107 In some cases, however, even this exclusively secular
exposure may lead to abandonment of sincerely held creationist
beliefs. A religion may demand a lifestyle cut off from much of
the modern world. 108 Exposure to an alternative to the six-day
Creation may coercively burden the free exercise of students belonging to such a religion. For these students, hereinafter re102. Indeed, the student's religious beliefs are vulnerable to evolutionary theory's influence for only a short time; usually less than 15 classroom hours per year are spent on
evolution lessons. See Note, supra note 9, at 564-65 n.241. This limited exposure to
evolution theory is hardly the kind or degree of burden placed on someone wholly incapable of exercising their belief without government cooperation, e.g., prisoners or military personnel. See Figinski, supra note 29, at 406-16. Nor is it comparable to the constant assault on religious beliefs suffered by the Amish through mere exposure to the
secular world. See supra note 101. With schoolchildren, church and parent have extensive opportunity outside school to present a full account of creationism and rebut the
theory of evolution.
103. See Hirschoff, supra note 1, at 883-85.
104. Compare Recent Developments, supra note 2, at 1056-59 (mere social pressure
and exposure without direct governmental compulsion does not amount to unconstitutional coercion), with Hirschoff, supra note 1, at 914 (many classroom settings provide
value clashes for students, but only very limited free exercise exemptions are allowable if
the state is to achieve its goals).
105. See supra note 44.
106. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
107. See Le Clercq, supra note 9, at 230.
108. The Amish provide the most well-known example of absolute separatist practices. The Amish do not collect unemployment, welfare benefits, or buy insurance; they
strive to maintain a completely self-contained and independent community. See The
Amish and the Law, TIME, Apr. 19, 1982, at 12. The Amish do not wish their children to
be exposed to worldly influences and so take their children out of public school at a
relatively early age. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 211 (1972).

WINTER

1982]

Religion Clauses

445

ferred to as "strict" creationists, mere exposure to alternative
theories becomes arguably coercive and therefore unconstitutional. 109 Part II discusses how these students may obtain relief
from this coercive burden.
3. Adequate state interest- Even though the state's action
constitutes a coercive burden, it may be justified as serving a
valid state interest. The coercive burden is justified, however,
only if the state interest cannot be "otherwise served."110 That
is, the state must show that no alternative means of achieving its
objective avoid coercively burdening religious free exercise. m
It is well settled that the state has a strong interest in public •
education. 112 The state interest in teaching natural sciences such
as biology is also undeniably great. 118 The state cannot pursue
this interest without teaching those theories which are well accepted by natural scientists. Virtually all natural scientists believe the theory of evolution is the proper explanation of the
earth's development. 114 Moreover, evolutionary theory is considered central to natural science explanations 1115 and is customarily
taught in biology, geology, and astronomy courses. 116 Conse109. It is important to distinguish "strict" separatist creationists from other creationists because the religious beliefs of "strict" separatists are more extensively contradicted
by the public school environment. Consequently, coercive burdens are more likely to occur. One example of Biblical Creationist strict separatism is the Apostolic Lutheran
faith; its believers are forbidden to watch movies, watch television, listen to the radio,
sing or dance to worldly music, or study evolution or "humanist" philosophy. See Davis
v. Page, 385 F. Supp. 395, 397 (D.N.H. 1973); see also Note, supra note 9, at 524 n.43.
Such a scrupulous separatism is probably burdened by mere exposure to evolution lessons. See Le Clercq, supra note 9, at 230; Note, supra note 9, at 564 n.239.
110. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972).
111. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 407 (1963); see also Note, supra note 9, at
542. Of course, the state can always alleviate such burdens by allowing exemptions from
the state regulation. In Sherbert, for instance, the finding that there were less burdensome ways to achieve desired ends did not mean the e,;isting regulation had to be struck
down, only that the complainant could no longer be subject to its provisions. 374 U.S. at
410.
112. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 213 (public education ranks "at the very
apex of a state"); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954)("education is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments").
113. Virtually every American high school offers a biology course. See Note, supra
note 9, at 536 n.101. Some states require schools to do so. See, e.g., OHIO REv. CODE ANN.
§ 3313.60 (Page 1972). Biology has become an increasingly important course, both to
explain rapid changes in biological innovation such as DNA research and genetic engineering, and also because many students need biology in order to attend college in
technical fields. See, e.g., Sears, The Importance of Biology Teaching for Secondary
School Pupils, 38 AM. BIOLOGY TCHR. 14 (1976), reprinted from 1 AM. BIOLOGY TCHR. 67
(1939).
114. See N.Y. Times, Apr. 20, 1982, at 22, col. 1 (midw. ed.).
115. See Hurd, supra note 66, at 391.
116. The theory of evolution is central to and interwoven throughout all major biology texts used in American high schools. See Note, supra note 9, at 537 n.1Q4 (citing E.
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quently, if the state is to further effectively its interest in
presenting natural science in public schools, it must present the
theory of evolution, for no less burdensome curriculum is available. This does not mean that no remedy exists under the free
exercise clause for strict creationists. 117 It simply means that
teaching evolutionary theory objectively118 is constitutionally
permissible.
In summary, the dual religion dauses of the first amendment
serve as constant monitors for religious freedom in public
schools. Public school presentation of evolutionary theory meets
these tests; no establishment clause violation is found, and the
free exercise burden is limited to "strict" creationists. Consequently, these "strict" creationists may warrant constitutional
relief; but the religion clauses warrant no relief for other creationists. For non-"strict" creationists, statutory remedies may
offer a solution, but these solutions themselves will need testing
against the establishment clause. The various forms of relief
available to creationists are discussed in part II.
II.

OBTAINING RELIEF FROM TEACHING THE THEORY OF
EVOLUTION

Several factors determine the choice of relief: whether the forum in which relief is being sought is judicial or legislative;
whether the complained-of activity demands constitutional relief; and if so, which religion clause is at issue. Judicial relief is
more limited than legislative relief. Courts cannot act without
finding a constitutional or statutory violation; no such restriction constrains legislative initiative. 119 Courts often are unable to
KLINCKMANN, BIOLOGY TEACHER'S HANDBOOK 16 (2d ed. 1970); Lee, The BSCS Position
on the Teaching of Biology, BSCS NEWSLE'ITER, Nov. 1972, at 5). This fact was reiterated by the court in McLean v. Arkansas Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255, 1259 (E.D.
Ark. 1982). See generally LIFE ON EARTH, supra note 8, at 500-21.
117. See infra notes 195-203 and accompanying text.
118. Improper presentation of the theory of evolution could, of course, trigger the
religion clauses. Dogmatic or evangelistic presentations must be eschewed. See infra
notes 189-90 and accompanying text.
119. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines lndep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503,
507 (1969)(affirming the "comprehensive authority" of state nonjudicial bodies to control
schools, as long as they act "consistent[ly] with fundamental constitutional safeguards").
Legislatures thus remain subject to judicial scrutiny. Id. Nevertheless, though legislatures may not pass on the ultimate constitutionality of state action, they may make a
"finding" of unconstitutionality and provide legislative relief. The conscientious objector
cases teach that Congress may choose to allow relief for those opposing war on religious
grounds though no constitutional relief is otherwise warranted. See, e.g., Welsh v. United

WINTER

1982)

Religion Clauses

447

fashion comprehensive relief; integrated and holistic solutions
are the legislature's specialty. 120 Legislatures and school boards,
therefore, direct their efforts toward structuring course content
and rarely grant students exemptions from class or proscribe
areas from the curriculum. 121 The courts, on the other hand, focus more on exemptions and proscriptions, finding prescription
of course content beyond their expertise and power.m
The form of relief available will also depend upon whether a
constitutional provision has been violated. For instance, if the
activity violates the establishment clause, elimination will be
necessary; the absolute proscription of the establishment clause
demands that no vestige of the violative material remain. 128 If
the violation is a free exercise burden, personal exemption is the
only relief available; it allows continuation of the state program
yet simultaneously provides relief to the complainant. 124 If, however, the courts find no constitutional violation, relief is limited
to legislative action, action which must itself pass the establishment clause test. Because public school presentation of evolutionary theory was found not to violate the religious free exercise
of most creationists and does not establish religion, relief must
be nonjudicial. These non-constitutional statutory remedies are
taken up first.
The most recent and controversial legislative remedy for exposure to the theory of evolution is "balanced treatment." This
remedy attempts to "neutralize" by legislation the potentially
antireligious impact of evolution instruction by adding to the
curriculum a counterbalancing lesson 1211 - usually a lesson in
States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970)(exemption from selective service is statutory not constitutional); United States v. MacIntosh, 283 U.S. 605, 624 (1931)(relief from military service
is a permissive accommodation not a constitutional right).
120. Cf. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955)(actual desegregation solutions
lie in the hands of school officials, though courts retain oversight jurisdiction and some
equitable power).
121. See Hirschoff, supra note 1, at 893-97, 942-52..
122. See, e.g., Wright v. Houston lndep. School Dist., 366 F. Supp. 1208, 1211 (S.D.
Tex. 1972)(c<iurts are "hardly qualified to select from among the available theories those
which merit attention in a public school biology class"), aff'd, 486 F.2d 137 (5th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 969 (1974).
123. See School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 224-25 (1963).
124. See infra notes 195-203 and accompanying text.
125. See Note, supra note 9, at 550 ("Public school instruction found to abridge free
exercise of religion can be neutralized by incorporation of countervailing viewpoints.").
But see McLean v. Arkansas Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255, 1274 (E.D. Ark. 1982)
(finding no legal merit in this approach). The McLean court correctly concluded that if
teaching the.theory of evolution is somehow religious in an establishment clause sense, it
must be eliminated outright, for no amount of counterteaching can undo the violation.
See id. But teaching evolutionary theory is not an establishment of religion. Id.; see
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what is known as "scientific creationism." 128 Creationists advocate balanced treatment for evolution and scientific creationism,
claiming that any impermissible religiosity involved in teaching
either lesson is "neutralized" by their joint presentation. 117 Because scientific creationism fails to pass the establishment clause
test, however, a balanced treatment act which uses the scientific
creation model is unconstitutional.
A.

Balanced Treatment with Scientific Creationism

The classroom is a "mini-marketplace of ideas."lll8 The
teacher should encourage a lively interchange of conflicting ideas
well supported by the academic community and pertinent to the
course of study promoted by the state. Interchange of ideas is
fostered by expanding the scope of classroom presentations, especially in controversial areas likely to become one-sided or dogmatic.129 Consequently, a "balanced treatment" act should address matters in current dispute so that the student will not
receive the distorted view that the issue is settled. Many areas of
study provoke substantial disagreement - including history and
political science,1 80 philosophy, 181 and comparative religion. 181
supra notes 26-86 and accompanying text. If presentation of evolutionary theory
presents free exercise coercion, continued exposure to evolution remains violative
whether or not the school imports a "counterbalancing" theory to offset the burden. This
"innoculation" approach, therefore, is unpersuasive, and complainants seeking constitutional relief are limited to elimination or exemption. This Note does not consider balanced treatment-neutralization as a possible judicial remedy in view of the judiciary's
inability to design sufficiently thorough curriculum guidelines, see supra note 122, and
because of the unprecedented nature of such relief, see Note, supra note 9, at 550-51
(proposal for neutralization unsupported by legal precedent).
126. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
127. See Note, supra note 9, at 550; Bird, supra note 48, at 168.
128. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 512
(1969)(citing Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)).
129. Kalven, supra note 13, at 520.
130. For instance, certain history texts written after the Civil War were zealously
pro-Union. Resulting protests prompted publishers to issue regional versions of the texts.
R.F. CAMPBELL, L. CUNNINGHAM, R. NYSTRAND & M. UsDAN, THE ORGANIZATION AND CONTROL OF THE SCHOOLS 325 (3d ed. 1975); see also Hirschoff, supra note 1, at 874 n.8.
Today a state might wish to promote the accurate portrayal of women or minorities in
American history lessons by mandating the use of more balanced texts or the use of
feminist historiographies. See, e.g., J. FRIEDMAN & W. SHADE, OUR AMERICAN SISTERS:
WOMEN IN AMERICAN LIFE AND THOUGHT 1 (2d ed. 1977). Some states require instruction
in American government and other political systems in order to illustrate the advantages
of the American system. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 545(l)(Supp. 1973)(instruction about
communism must be given for the purpose of "instilling in the minds of students a
greater appreciation of democratic process, freedom under law, and the will to preserve
that freedom"); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 233.064 (West Supp. 1976)(courses in "Americanism
versus Communism" required); see also Hirschoff, supra note 1, at 883.
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Balanced treatment might be considered appropriate in such
fields.
Balanced treatment might also be desirable in scientific subjects when one position has become unjustifiably dogmatic. 11•
The counterbalancing arms of the balanced treatment, however,
must each be secular; otherwise, the program would violate the
establishment clause. Consequently, scientific creationism, unless free from religious motivation and effects, is an un_acceptable subject for balanced treatment. Although proponents of the
scientific creation model proclaim its secular character,1 84 close
scrutiny reveals their arguments to be without merit.
1. Development of the balanced treatment by scientific creationism alternative- Fundamentalists have assailed Darwin's
131. See Note, supra note 9, at 551 (suggesting that if a philosophy course were to
address the subject of the existence of God in a nonreligious context using only theists,
incorporation of the study of atheists might neutralize the course).
132. Comparative religion courses offer perhaps the only acceptable forum for public
school presentation of alternate religious beliefs and practice. Yet even here great care
must be exercised to avoid doctrinaire or biased presentation which might contravene
the establishment prohibition. Classes discussing the Bible or other religious material
must be presented, if at all, "objectively as part of a secular program of education."
School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963); accord Epperson v. Arkansas, 393
U.S. 97, 106 (1968); see also infra text accompanying notes 191-93; Le Clercq, supra note
9, at 219. One commentator, however, writes:
The inherent problem with teaching about religion in the primary grades is that
the students may be too intellectually immature and unsophisticated to differentiate the literary and historical aspects of the Bible from its religious dogma.
"Reading the Bible to students in the lower grades, who are not mature enough
to comprehend the literary or historical values of it seldom can be other than a
devotional exercise . . . . "
Recent Developments, Constitutional Law - First Amendment - Establishment
Clause - Bible Study in the Public Schools, Wiley v. Board of Education, 468 F. Supp.
133 (E.D. Tenn. 1979), 47 TENN. L. REv. 181, 195 (1979) (citing Casad, On Teaching
Religion at the State University, 12 U. KAN. L. REv. 405, 411 (1964)).
133. A pertinent comparison can be made with the medieval Catholic Church ban on
all discussion of the Copernican theory of heliocentricity. See supra note 57. A similar
prejudice today might be subject to balancing. In the Soviet Union, for example, the
head of the science establishment, Trofim Lysenko, for many years enforced by fiat the
view that evolution was not an acceptable explanation of biological development. See Y.
CRIPPS, CONTROLLING TECHNOLOGY 4 (1980)(Lysenko opposed Darwinism on grounds that
it inhibited the ideological training of young Soviets). If a similarly one-sided and absolute view were to prevail in some state the legislature might feel the need to redress the
balance. A similar situation is quite unlikely to occur in modem America, however, where
many scientists constantly attack and improve current theories. See supra notes 59, 6265 & 78.
134. Note, supra note 9, at 517: "[T]he conflict is not between science and religion,
but between two theoretical models that build upon scientific observation and criticism
and that harmonize with some religions and have overtones contrary to others." But cf.
J. CAMPBELL, MYTHS To LIVE Bv 90 (Bantam ed. 1973)(conflict between science and Bible-based religion is actually conflict between two sciences: "that of 4000 B.C. and that
of A.O. 2000").
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theory since it was first proposed, finding it repugnant to their
faith in Genesis, 181 the biblical account of Creation. Their attempts to prohibit the teaching of evolutionary theory, however,
were found to be religiously motivated, 188 and the alternative of
teaching Biblical Creationism along with evolution was found to
promote establishment-religion. 187 A less sectarian theory was
clearly necessary if evolution was to be countered by a creation
scenario.
Consequently, creationists established research centers to find
evidence to fortify creation scenarios or undermine evolution. 188
These efforts culminated in the theory of "scientific" creationism.189 Its proponents claim that scientific creationism is constitutionally distinguishable from Biblical Creationism because of
its omission of biblical references and focus on scientific argument. 14° For instance, scientific creationism makes no reference
to the six Creation days, Adam and Eve, Noah, or any other explicit biblical passage. Rather, the scientific creation "model"
postulates a recent origin of the universe, including man; a
worldwide catastrophic flood which buried almost all known life;
135. See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text; Note, supra note 9, at 519-22
(examining the many creationist religions opposed to evolution); McLean v. Arkansas
Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255, 1258-59 (E.D. Ark. 1982). Fundamentalist efforts effectively suppressed the teaching of evolutionary theory in schools until the early 1960's. Id.
at 1259; Le Clercq, supra note 9, at 209~(citing findings that fewer than one-half of
American high school biology teachers taught evolution during this time).
Fundamentalist efforts were overcome when the 1957 Sputnik launch spurred massive
infusions of money for the revision of science texts. L. THURMAN, supra note 8, at 21.
These revised texts, developed by the Biological Sciences Curriculum Study ("BSCS"),
rely heavily on the theory of evolution as a comprehensive explanation for biological
developments. Presently, 50% of American high school students use BSCS texts, and
virtually all other texts are influenced by this approach. See Note, supra note 9, at 521
n.25.
136. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 107-08 (1968). Soon after Epperson, Mississippi repealed the last of the state anti-evolution laws. L. THURMAN, supra note 8, at 22;
see supra note 13.
137. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
138. The McLean court listed several Fundamentalist organizations formed to promote the idea that the Book of Genesis was supported by scientific data: Institute for
Creation Research ("ICR")(affiliated with the Christian Heritage College, supported by
the Scott Memorial Baptist Church in San Diego, California, and publishing as CreationLife Publishing Company, the largest publisher of creationist material); Creation Science
Research Center ("CSRC")(San Diego-based); Bible Science Association ("BSA") (Minneapolis, Minnesota); Creation Research Society ("CRS")(an organization of literal Fundamentalists with master's degrees in a scientific field). McLean v. Arkansas Bd. of
Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255, 1259-60 (E.D. Ark. 1982). Notably, the CSRC, concerned about
an overly scientific bent to CRS activities, split from CRS in 1970 in order to promote a
more Bible-oriented creationism. Id.
139. Id. at 1259; Le Clercq, supra note 9, at 210 (describing the rise of the creationist
associations and the increasingly scientific orientation of many creati~nists).
140. See SCIENTIFIC CREATIONISM, supra note 14, at 3; Note, supra note 9, at 517.
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and the constancy of life "kinds. " 141 These proposals are counterpoints to certain evolutionary tenets, viz., a multi-billion-year
development of the universe, with man's emergence in the recent
tens to hundreds of thousands of years; uniform change in the
earth's geology and fossilization; and evolution and natural selection of species. m
Scientific creationists hope to employ balanced treatment to
"undogmatize" the present exclusive presentation of evolutionary theory and to neutralize the perceived religious impact of
evolution instruction. 148 While the recent decision in McLean v.
Arkansas Board of Education 14" casts doubt on the future of
these efforts, other states continue to pass balanced treatment
laws. 1411 Moreover, a popular majority in many places apparently
favor balanced treatment of evolution theory and creationism in
public schools. 146 The next section discusses whether the teaching of scientific creationism in public schools is constitutionally
permissible.
2. Scientific creationism and the establishment clauseCreationists concede that teaching Biblical Creationism in the
public schools is an establishment violation. 147 Whether scientific creationism can clear the hurdles which blocked its predecessor is a question of religious purpose and effects.
a. Secular purpose- The establishment clause prohibits any
state action intended to advance or inhibit religion. 148 Courts
will strike down a purportedly secular state act on establishment
grounds if the actual intent of its proponents is religious. 149
141. See supra note 15.
142. See supra note 8.
143. See, e.g., SCIENTIFIC CREATIONISM, supra note 14, at 14; see also Note, supra note
9, at 551. This movement prompted the Arkansas Balanced Treatment Act. See McLean
v. Arkansas Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255, 1262.
144. 529 F. Supp. 1255 (E.D. Ark. 1982).
145. See Balanced Treatment for Creation,Science and Evolution-Science Act, LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 17:286.1 to .7 (West Supp. 1982); see also S. 2256 (Miss. 1981)(not
passed by Miss. House).
146. See N.Y. Times, Mar. 7, 1982, § 4, at 19, col. 1 (midw. ed.)("[l]n many rural
school districts, creationism is still taught routinely, since that is the wish of the school
board and the majority of the community."); see also Comment, supra note 3, at 446
(two-thirds of Nebraska teachers polled present Divine Creation in class). The McLean
court accepted the findings of recent polls indicating that a majority of Americans are
not opposed to presentation of creationism along with evolution. The Court dismissed
this finding as not relevant to the constitutional question. 529 F. Supp. at 1274.
147. See, e.g., Note, supra note 9, at 553-54; SCIENTIFIC CREATIONISM, supra note 14,
at 3; see also supra note 14.
148. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971); School Dist. v. Schempp, 374
U.S. 203, 222 (1963).
149. See Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41 (1980)(per curiam).
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Many proponents of the balanced treatment of evolution and
scientific creationism, including some of the legislative sponsors
of evolution-creation balanced treatment acts, work to further
the religious aspects of creationism1110 and protect scientific creationist beliefs from attack by lessons on evolution or other theories concerning the origin of life. m Indeed, the motivation of
those proposing the teaching of scientific creationism seems
identical to the motivation of those who earlier advocated Biblical Creationism. In most respects, scientific creationism is indistinguishable from the Genesis account of Creation, and virtually
all scientific creationists believe in Biblical Creationism. 1111 Thus,
there is ample proof of an impermissible religious purpose and
motivation behind the evolution-creation balanced treatment
acts. 1113
150. The McLean court found that the "creationist organizations consider the introduction of creation science into the public schools part of their ministry." 529 F. Supp.
at 1260. For instance, creationists in Arkansas organized political lobbying efforts in order to get the Arkansas Balanced Treatment Act passed. A local group of ministers
adopted a resolution supporting the Act, appointed two of their members to implement
the resolution by lobbying, and prevailed upon a local state senator to guide the Act
through an uninformed state legislature. Id. at 1262. The court also found that the
drafter of the Arkansas Balanced Treatment Act was on a "religious crusade" to inject
creationism into the schools, id. at 1261, and that the legislative sponsor of the bill was
"motivated solely by his religious beliefs and desire to see the Biblical version of creation
taught in the public schools," id. at 1263. The same religious fervor is evident in the
authors of scientific creationist texts. See, e.g., Barnes, Foreword, in H. MORRIS, supra
note 12, at 4 ("It is the burning desire in Dr. Morris' life that all may have the opportunity to hear this and be brought to a knowledge of the historicity of the Scriptures, and
of course to a faith in the true God of Creation.").
151. Scientific creationists sometimes assert that there are basically two viewpoints of
origins, i.e., evolution and "the doctrine of special creation," though "several variants of
each have been developed." BIOLOGY: A SEARCH FOR ORDER IN COMPLEXITY, supra note
53, at xvii. This is partially accurate in that supporters of evolution attempt to utilize
only naturalistic explanations, while creationists rely to some extent on non-natural explanations. But lumping together all the versions of origins does violence to the beliefs of
many non-scientific creationists. See Wright v. Houston lndep. School Dist., 366 F.
Supp. 1208, 1211 (S.D. Tex. 1972)("1f the beliefs of fundamentalism were the sole alternative to the Darwinian theory, equal time might at least be feasible. But virtually every
religion known to man holds its own peculiar views of human origins."), aff'd per curiam,
486 F:2d 137 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 969 (1974); L. THURMAN, supra note
8, at 40, 115 (noting the existence of at least six versions of creation, each one "scientifically or theologically possible, although each one also has certain weaknesses"). But see
Sc1ENTll'IC CREATIONISM, supra note 14, at 215-55 (analyzing each of the creation theories
besides scientific creationism and dismissing each as scientifically impossible and theologically unfounded).
152. Applicants for one major scientific creati<mist organization must subscribe to a
statement of belief which includes literal belief in Genesis and other Biblical Creationist
tenets. See id. at 1260 n.7. The author of the definitive text on scientific creationism, see
SCIENTIFIC CREATIONISM, supra note 14, is an avowed Biblical Creationist. See H. MORRIS, supra note 12, at 4. See generally Note, supra note 9, at 558 n.210.
153. See, e.g., McLean, 529 F. Supp. at 1264.
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Reliance on the intent of the sponsors and supporters of scientific creationism, however, is a shifting basis for a constitutional
determination. If the religious purpose should eventually dissipate, the basis for the decision would evaporate as well. The primary effect test thus offers a more solid basis for decision.
b. Primary effects- To be acceptable constitutionally, a
state act may not have as its principal or primary effect the advancement or inhibition of religion; any such effect must be no
more than an incidental side effect which merely harmonizes
with religious or irreligious beliefs. 11" Scientific creationism does
more than harmonize with the biblical account of Genesis - it
is virtually indistinguishable from it. 11111 Scientific creationism
unavoidably implies biblical personages and explanations. For
instance, though the scientific creationist theory of "catastrophism"1118 makes no reference to Noah and his Ark, it clearly
suggests the biblical story. The scientific creationist account suggests that human beings and animals could have survived the
flood only by riding it out in some sort of watertight vessel. 1117
The primary effect, both actual and intended, is to present
Noah's Ark as a scientifically necessary and historically accurate
explanation for the continuation of man and all living things following such a catastrophe. Any student with the least exposure
to the story of Noah in the Bible will immediately recognize this
"coincidence." The actual effect of that lesson is thus impermissibly religious.
Nor is this religious effect incidental. Portions of the scientific
154. Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 775 (1973); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
155. McLean, 529 F. Supp. at 1265.

156. Catastrophism is the scientific creationist theory that a worldwide flood, perhaps
three miles deep, caused most of the major geological changes on earth. See SCIENTIFIC
CREATIONISM, supra note 14, at 91-130. The public school edition of this textbook on
creationism scrupulously avoids any exact reference to the Bible, or to specifics such as
the date or height of the flood. See id. at 117; see also id. at iv (explaining that the
general edition and public school edition are the same, but for a chapter on "Creation
According to Scripture" in the former).
157. Noah is not discussed explicitly in the general edition of Scientific Creationism
outside of the last chapter on Scripture. Transparent language, however, is used to explain how life survived the Deluge:
Sooner or later all land animals would perish. Many, but not all marine animals would perish. Human beings would swim, run, climb, and attempt to escape the floods but, unless a few managed to ride out the cataclysm in unusually strong watertight sea-going vessels they would eventually all drown or
otherwise perish.
Id. at 117 (emphasis added). This hardly oblique reference is explained in the last chapter as being the story of Noah and his Ark. Id. at 253. Even without the biblical citation
at the end, this explanation conveys "an inescapable religiosity." McLean, 529 F. Supp.
at 1265.
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creation model - such as catastrophism - go beyond mere harmony with religion. Because this "scientific" model so closely
parallels the biblical account, it imparts science's aura of empirical certainty to a specific religious story. This religious effect is
its primary, indeed sole effect. In this respect it can be distinguished from state action which has other significant nonreligious consequences, for instance, a Sunday-closing statute,
which only incidentally advances or inhibits Saturday worship. 1118 Scientific creationism does not promote scientific understanding; it serves only to fortify the literal message of
Genesis. 1119
It would be, however, unnecessarily hostile to religion to ban
all biblical data merely because of its source. If biblical information or data could be independently verified, the religious source
of the original information would not make it objectionable.
Many creationists believe that the Bible is not only historically
accurate but also scientifically correct. 180 The scientific merit in
the scientific creationist theory, or "model,"161 however, is meager. The model's explanation of origins is empirically unverifiable, cannot be experimentally tested, and is not subject to refinement or change. 162
Most significantly, though, scientific creationism goes beyond
the bounds of any scientific approach by suggesting that nature's
"design" or "direction" infers a purposeful designer. 168 Indeed,
scientific creationism relies on many non-natural and external
158. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
159. Scientists have characterized scientific creationism as "forced imposition of religious doctrine, disguised as science, into the science textbooks." Mayer, supra note 59, at
415. It has also been called the "smuggling of religious dogma into classrooms in a scientific Trojan horse." Mayer, Creationism: A Masquerade, 36 AM. BIOLOGY TcHR. 245, 246
(1974); cf. Goldberg, supra note 26, at 28 n.182 ("The establishment of religion clause
cannot be evaded simply by asserting that a given government-supported program is
'science' rather than religion.").
160. See, e.g., J. MooRE, supra note 11, at 10.
161. Creationists use the term "model" or "theory" interchangeably, but in a sense
entirely different from its use by evolutionary scientists. See Mayer, supra note 59, at
412; see also McLean, 529 F. Supp. at 1269 ("A theory that is by its own terms dogmatic,
absolutist and never subject to revision is not a scientific theory.").
162. Creationists concede that scientific creationism is not subject to the scientific
method. See, e.g., SCIENTIFIC CREATIONISM, supra note 14, at 5; see also H. MORRIS, supra
note 12, at 80-81. Some creationists are even willing to admit to the religious nature of
scientific creationism. See McLean, 529 F. Supp. at 1268 (citing D. G1sH, EvoumoN?
THE Foss1Ls SAY No! 42 (3d ed. 1979)).
163. See, e.g., SCIENTIFIC CREATIONISM, supra note 14, at 33, 35 ("The creation model
does include, quite explicitly, the concept of purpose. The Creator was purposive, not
capricious or indifferent, as He planned and then created the universe . . . . " "The creationist explanation . . . gives assurance that there is real meaning and eternal purpose to
existence."); see also BIOLOGY: A SEARCH FOR ORDER IN COMPLEXITY, supra note 53, at 12.
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explanations which are eschewed by the natural scientist. 1414 For
instance, scientific creationism, ostensibly divorced from all biblical references, relies fundamentally on an element.which is religious under any analysis - the existence of a Creator. 1611 Creationists respond to this criticism by pointing out that the
government makes frequent reference to God in its publications
and deliberations. 188 Such references, however are ancillary to
the content of these publications and deliberations; deleting
these references would not affect significantly the content. Deleting the references to the "creator" in scientific creationist
texts, on the other hand, would effectively vitiate the presentation. The pervasive reference to and essential reliance upon an
external Supreme Cause and Controller manifest in the scientific
creationist literature makes the model undeniably religious. 187 A
Supreme Cause is the philosophical base of all theism, whether
biblically based or not. Explanations that rely on _external nonnatural causes are not science: they bear the unmistakable
markings of an establishment-religion. 188
c. Entanglement- The entanglement prohibition bars fis164. See Note, supra note 9, at 557 n.209.
165. See Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342 (1890)("The term 'religion' has reference
to one's views of his relations to his Creator . . . . "); see also Malnak v. Yogi, 440 F.
Supp. 1284, 1322 (D.N.J. 1977)("[C]oncepts concerning ... a supreme being of some
sort are manifestly religious . . . . These concepts do not shed that religiosity merely
because they are presented as a philosophy or as a science."), aff'd per curiam, 592 F.2d
197 (3d Cir. 1979). Creationist· texts are filled with references to a Creator or God. See,
e.g., SCIENTIFIC CREATIONISM, supra note 14 (chapters intended for public school use refer
to a creator more than 15 times, to God at least a half-dozen times); BIOLOGY: A SEARCH
FOR ORDER IN COMPLEXITY, supra note 53 ("Creator," 19 times; "God," 25 times; Bible
personages, 10 times). See generally Note, supra note 9, at 560 n.220.
166. See Note, supra note 9, at 557 n.208.
167. See McLean v. Arkansas Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255, 1265-66 (E.D. Ark.
1982).
168. Some creationists are willing to admit that creationism is theistic and even a
literal reading of Genesis, but feel that presentation of the creation model in public
schools remains acceptable. See, e.g., McLean, 529 F. Supp. at 1266 ("teaching the existence of God is not religious unless the teaching seeks a commitment")(citing testimony
of Dr. Norman Geisler). One commentator has remarked:
I assure my students when I explain the creation model and evolution model
of first origins that class work will not involve religion. By this I mean that no
worship will be involved in class, no special conduct or ritual will be followed;
that is, no prayer beads or prayer rug will be used, no facing the east, or worshipful conduct or ritual will be practiced. Hence no religion is involved in my
classes.
J. MOORE, supra note 11, at 88.·The District Court in McLean correctly dismissed this
creationist definition of religion because it "is contrary to common understanding and
contradicts settled case law." 529 F. Supp. at 1266 (citing Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39
(1980)(per curiam); School Dist.. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963)).
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cal 169 and doctrinal involvement with religion. 170 While the entanglement test is relatively unimportant once religious purpose
and primary effect are found, 171 it may provide an additional
ground for decision in close cases. Creationists argue that the
scientific evidence for creation is doctrinally separable from the
religious evidence and that the two can be kept separate. 171 But
to allow the presentation of scientific evidence for creation entangles the state in the doctrinal segregation of "religious" creation and "scientific" creation evidence. The school board would
assume the very role the entanglement doctrine prohibits - extensive involvement in religious controversy178 - if it were to
conduct extensive monitoring to keep religion out of creationism
lessons. This doctrinal involvement is especially acute when
school boards are faced with at least six creation versions. 174 The
school may, of course, present evidence against evolution that
does not support a creation model.
In conclusion, scientific creationism fails to fulfill its purportedly secular promise. In purpose and effect it advances fundamentalist religions and engenders an extensive governmental entanglement with religious issues. Mandating instruction in
scientific creationism - even as part of a balanced treatment
program - is an establishment of religion. Creationists must
pursue relief in other forms.
169. Because scientific creationism is religion, the state sponsorship of creationist
literature or provision of class time for creationist teachings is impermissible entanglement. See McLean, 529 F. Supp. at 1272. Private donation of the schoolbooks might
ameliorate that entanglement. Classroom presentation, however, remains an impermissible fiscal entanglement. Id.
170. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
171. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
172. See McLean, 529 F. Supp. at 1265-66. Since passage of the Arkansas Balanced
Treatment Act, creationists have focused on the less religious aspects of scientific creationism and have attempted to sever some of the portions of the theory which are too
closely aligned with the Bible. See Louisiana Balanced Treatment Act, LA. R.Ev. STAT.
ANN. §§ 17:286.1 to .7 (West Supp. 1982); N.Y. Times, Mar. 4, 1982, § 4, at 19, col. 1
(midw. ed.). In addition, the expositions in creationist texts are becoming less religious
and increasingly more sophisticated and "scientific". See, e.g., SCIENTIFIC CREATIONISM,
supra note 14 (a high school creationist text which includes relatively technical discussions of thermodynamics and radiometric dating).
173. Cf. Presbyterian Church v. Hull Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969)(civil courts may
not resolve church disputes on the basis of religious doctrine); Wiley v. Franklin, 468 F.
Supp. 133 (E.D. Tenn.), enforced mem., 474 F. Supp. 525 (E.D. Tenn. 1979)(describing
with particularity the portions of the Bible which could be presented in public school in
an objective, secular fashion).
174.

See L. THURMAN, supra note 8, at 40.
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B. Eliminating Evolution from School Curricula
Elimination of a school lesson is the most drastic method of
relief. It is appropriate only when the complained-of activity violates the establishment clause and a less compehensive remedy
would leave the violative act intact. na Elimination is an inappropriate remedy in free exercise cases, because in such cases exempting the burdened student will suffice. 178 Moreover, eliminating the arguably burdensome instruction would be an
overinclusive remedy in free exercise cases, because it would deprive many students of an important educational experience in
order to unburden the religious beliefs of a few. 177
Elimination of evolution lessons has been suggested as a form
of relief from exclusive presentation of evolution theory. 178
Teaching the theory of evolution, however, presents no establishment violation, 179 and elimination is not available for free exercise relief. 18° Consequently, courts could not provide this relief.
Legislatures would not be so constrained, but such affirmative
relief for creationists without a judicial finding of an establishment violation necessarily renders the action suspect. If the
course elimination had the purpose or primary effect of advancing creationism by ridding the schools of evolutionary discussion, the establishment clause may be violated. 181
Eliminating instruction in evolution - even if neither religion
clause is thereby violated - still might offend other constitutional provisions. Although legislatures and school boards may
control course content182 and remove most secular material, 183
175. See School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 224-25 (1963).
176. See infra notes 195-203 and accompanying text.
177. See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 107 (1968)("The state has no legitimate
interest in protecting any or all religions from views distasteful to them."); cf. Choper,
supra note 26, at 349 (When the state's program is held to be secular, "dissenters cannot
require the state to abandon it [for that] would indeed be minority oppression of the
majority.").
178. Note, supra note 9, at 565-70.
179. See supra notes 26-86 and accompanying text.
180. See infra note 196.
181. See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 103, 109 (1963)(the state may not "blot
out a particular theory because of its supposed conflict with" a religious doctrine; antievolution statute constituted an establishment of religion because evolution was banned
"for the sole reason that it [was] deemed to conflict with a particular religious doctrine").
182. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 402 (1923); see also Epperson v. Arkansas, 393
U.S. at 111 ("It would be difficult to make a First Amendment case out of a state law
eliminating the subject of higher mathematics, or astronomy, or biology from its curriculum.")(Black, J., concurring). The Epperson majority suggested that the elimination
statute might have been allowed had it proscribed "all discussion of the origin of man."
Id. at 109; see also Zykan v. W8.fli8W Community School Corp., 631 F.2d 1300, 1305 (7th

458

Journal of Law Reform

[VOL. 15:2

they cannot ban "an entire system of respected human
thought" 18" merely because its ideas are controversial. 1811 This
would undermine the purpose of freedom of speech in a pluralistic society. Moreover, sweeping state restrictions on what can be
taught in public schools would violate teachers' first amendment
rights to academic freedom 186 as well as students' rights to receive information. 187
Were the theory of evolution merely ancillary to science, its
elimination would not cause great concern. But the theory of
evolution is central to the explanation of biology, geology, and
astronomy. The resultant chilling effect on science and scientific
research is reason enough to disallow this remedy. 188 For students, especially students wishing to pursue a scientific or medical profession, to miss these courses of study would be a severe
handicap.
Cir. 1980); Arunda v. Dekalb County School Dist., 620 F.2d 493 (5th Cir. 1980). See
generally supra note 22.
183. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
184. Epperson, 393 U.S. at 116 (Stewart, J., concurring).
185. See, e.g., Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95-96 (1972)("[A]bove all else, the
First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because of
its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content."). This strong presumption
against content-based speech regulations is apparently not conclusive; but the Court's
exceptions are not applicable to the present discussion. See Young v. American Mini
Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 (1976); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978)(allowing regulation of protected speech that was sexually explicit or patently offensive).
186. Cf. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1969)(academic freedom, especially for university professors, is a special concern of the first amendment); Healy v.
James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972)(academic freedom precludes university administration from
barring student groups' campus recognition). But see Zykan v. Warsaw Community
School Corp., 631 F.2d 1300 (7th Cir. 1980)(academic freedom in secondary schools,
though recognized, is limited by the intellectual skills of students and the great state
interest controlling education); Palmer v. Board of Educ., 603 F.2d 1271 (7th Cir.
1979)(secondary school teachers have no absolute right to teach as they please), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 626 (1980). See generally Le Clercq, supra note 9, at 232-41 (discussing
the rights of students and teachers under the broad penumbra of "academic due
process").
187. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969)("1t is now well established that
the Constitution protects the right to receive information and ideas."); accord Virginia
State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens' Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 756
(1976). While the Supreme Court has not explicitly recognized a secondary student's first
amendment "right to receive information," lower courts have. See Minarcini v. Strongsville City School Dist., 541 F.2d 577 (6th Cir. 1976); Salvail v. Nashua Bd. of Educ., 469
F. Supp. 1269 (D.N.H. 1979); Right to Read Defense Comm. v. School Comm. of Chelsea,
454 F. Supp. 703 (D. Mass. 1978).
188. See Robertson, The Scientist;s Right to Research: A Constitutional Analysis, 51
S. CAL. L. REV. 1203, 1204, 1248-53 (1978)(explaining the constitutional grounds for a
"right to research"). But cf. Goldberg, supra note 26, at 11-16 (speech and press "clauses
protect scientific communication and expression, not the performance of experiments").
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Curriculum Modification

Although balanced treatment and elimination are improper
free exercise remedies, several permissible remedies remain. One
is to avoid dogmatic presentations of evolution. Another is to
allow creation to be presented, not as a scientifically valid alternative, but as one of the many creation stories of the world's
religions.
1. "Undogmatizing" the evolution lesson- Lessons which
imply that evolution is an accepted fact, or "the final word," do
a grave disservice to the student. Natural science education
must train the child to think critically about present scientific
theories.1 89 Consequently, those textbooks which represent the
theory of evolution dogmatically may warrant some modification
to reflect the theory's inherent uncertainty. 190 Admittedly, the
more technical weaknesses of evolutionary theory will be lost on
younger children. Nevertheless, elementary texts could emphasize that no scientific theory - not even evolution - should be
blindly accepted.
2. Comparative religion courses- Despite its religious underpinnings, the subject of scientific creationism need not be banished altogether. 191 The Constitution does not prohibit instruction in the world's religions, provided such instruction is
conducted in a secular and neutral fashion. 192 While the school
cannot favor or disfavor any particular religion, it may analyze
objectively the various religions of the world. Accordingly, biblical and scientific creationism, though inappropriate in the science classroom, are proper subjects for a comparative religion
course. The course could cover religious views of the universe's
origin, presenting not only Genesis, but the creation accounts of
other religions as well. 193 This presentation would help allay the
189. See, e.g., Hurd, supra note 66, at 392.
190. Presenting the theory of evolution too equivocally would, of course, undermine
its presentation. Moreover, changes made solely for religious accommodations may violate the establishment clause. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 107-08 (1968). Nevertheless, certain modificiations may be useful, though some evolutionary scientists fear
that "modification" means "undermining." See Creation Compromised, Sci. AM., Feb.
1973, at 47; see also Letters, Creationism and Evolution, 179 SCIENCE 953, 953-56 (1973).
See generally Le Clercq, supra note 9, at 211 nn.6-7.
191. See, e.g., School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 306 (1963)(Goldberg, J., concurring)(the establishment clause does not forbid teaching about religion); id. at 225 (opinion of the Court)(schools may use the Bible in literature or history classes if neutrally
presented); see also Epperson v. Arkansas, 398 U.S. 97, 106 (1963).
192. See supra note 132.
193. There are many creation accounts believed throughout the world, each deserving
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fears of creationist parents and ameliorate the free exercise burden felt by many creationist students. Exposure to biblical and
scientific creationism in a comparative religion class, combined
with the creationist child's training in church and at home,
should eliminate whatever threat instruction of evolutionary
theory poses to the religious free exercise of all but "strict"
creationists.

D. Exemption
Individual exemption or excusal from evolution lessons is the
best form of relief where the instruction burdens only a few194
and the state interest is not sufficient to justify the burden. In
this way the state is allowed, for the most part, to pursue its
desired ends. 1911 In the last thirty years, exemption has been the
exclusive remedy awarded in cases based solely on free exercise
complaints. 196
commensurate treatment should the school choose to present one. Of course, many
school districts and states will oppose such a plan, realizing that mere exposure to diverse religions in the setting of the public classroom may lead to indoctrination. See, e.g.,
Recent Developments, supra note 132, at 195.
194. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)(only 93 children in the school
district potentially burdened); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)(only two burdened complainants in the area); Note, supra note 9, at 549 nn.165-66.
195. Exempting the Amish from attending secondary school left the state free to continue teaching non-Amish children without change. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205
(1972). More extensive relief for the free exercise claim might have been unduly disruptive, frustrating the state's educational goals. See Note, supra note 9, at 545. For a general analysis of the exemption remedy, see Note, Religious Exemptions Under the Free
Exercise Clause: A Model of Competing Authorities, 90 YALE L.J. 350, 352-65 (1980).
196. See Thomas v. Review Bd., Ind. Employment Sec. Div. 450 U.S. 707 (1981)(exempting Jehovah's Witness from obligation to manufacture war materiel); Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)(exempting Amish children from post-eighth grade education);
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)(exempting Seventh-day Adventist from Saturday work requirement); United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944)(not allowing verity
of religious doctrines to be explored in fraud prosecution); Follett v. Town of McCormick, 321 U.S. 573 (1944)(exempting religious sales from tax); Cantwell v. Connecticut,
310 U.S. 296 (1940)(exempting sales of religious literature from licensure requirements).
Two other cases provided statutory exemptions: Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333
(1970) and United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1963). See Note, supra note 9, at 549.
Commentators have claimed that elimination of the violati~e program is available as
free exercise relief. See, e.g., id. at 549-50; Note, supra note 195, at 350 n.l. Admittedly,
a number of Supreme Court cases have granted elimination as a remedy while purporting to protect free exercise rights. Careful analysis reveals, however, that in each of these
cases free exercise was an alternative holding - either an establishment violation or
some other first amendment abridgement was present to trigger elimination. In McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978), Tennessee had disqualified clergymen as legislators. The
Supreme Court's plurality opinion, though focusing on free exercise, mentioned neutrality. The concurring opinion extended this point and correctly noted that this "patent
hostility" toward clerics had a primary effect which inhibited religion, thereby violating
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Where free exercise complaints are anticipated, some accommodating legislation may be appropriate. For instance, statutory
exemption has been authorized where the religious burden is imposed by other statutory provisions. 197 Exemptions prompted by
religious motives, however, may exempt individuals from onerous state obligations, or conversely, cause a substantial denial of
state benefits, thus violating the establishment clause's neutrality command. 198
Exemption obviously is not a perfect remedy. 199 A student exempt from a lesson foregoes an educational experience shared by
peers. In addition, the mere act of asking for an exemption can
the establishment clause. Id. at 636 (Brennan, J., concurring). In Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S.
319 (1972)(per curiam), a state prison barred Buddhists, but not other religions, from
religious practices. The Court held that Texas had "violated the First and Fourteenth
Amendments," including the free exercise clause. Id. at 322. But discrimination between
religions is an establishment violation. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15
(1947). In Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961), the state required public officers to
recite a religious oath. While a free exercise claim would have been easily sustained, the
Court chose instead to consider the oath an aid to religion, and relied heavily on establishment cases in its analysis. Id. at 492-95. In Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344
U.S. 94 (1951), a state statute authorized official recognition of a church faction. While
this may have burdened the free exercise of the nonrecognized faction, it also aided a
religion and entangled the state in ecclesiastical disputes, both prohibited by the establishment clause. In Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), the Court struck
down a law which disallowed private and parochial schools. The decision could not rely
on free exercise grounds because the free exercise clause had not yet been extended to
the states. Id. at 535. If decided today, the free exercise clause might be an alternative
holding; but the purpose and primary effect of inhibiting all religious schools would undoubtedly invoke the establishment clause and therefore trigger elimination.
Other elimination cases which ostensibly turned on free exercise issues expressly
presented alternative first amendment grounds. E.g., Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67
(1953); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951)(state discrimination against Jehovah's Witnesses violates the first amendment; no explicit clause cited but free speech and
establishment violation readily apparent in addition to the free exercise problem); Kunz
v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951)(prohibition of public worship on city streets without
permit violated free exercise and free speech); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946);
Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943)(prohibition of religious literature distribution violated free exercise and free press); Largent v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413 (1943)(religious literature license violated free exercise and free press).
197. See, e.g., N.Y. Enuc. LAW § 3204(5) (McKinney 1970)(Christian Science students may be excused when the germ theory of disease is taught); TEx. Enuc. ConE ANN.
§ 21.104 (Vernon 1972)(exemption allowed from physiology and hygiene course if instruction conflicts with the religious teachings of a "well established church" to which
child belongs); WASH. REv. ConE ANN. § 28A.05.030 (West 1970)(excusal from physical
education classes for "religious belier'). See generally Hirschoff, supra note I, at 893.
198. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220-21 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner,
374 U.S. 393, 409 (1963); see also Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 609 (1961)(to exempt Saturday worshippers from Sunday-closing law might discriminate against Sunday
worshippers).
199. See Note, supra note 9, at 543-70 (exemption is inadequate in face of widespread abridgement of free exercise, though elimination may be too drastic a solution in
some cases).
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be stigmatizing, though such singling out is an unavoidable part
of the experience of nonconformists in our culture. 200 Nevertheless, the most appropriate form of relief for the "strict" creationist student is exemption from the evolution classes. 201 This remedy satisfies the state interest in teaching the natural science
course and does not deny non-creationist children exposure to
the important concepts of evolution theory. 202 Moreover, the
"strict" creationist student suffers no unfair denial of state benefits, having expressed no interest in receiving the benefit. 203
CONCLUSION

The contemporary debate bet~een creationists and supporters
of the theory of evolution raises many difficult issues, often obscured by the invariably strong emotions engendered by the controversy. At a fundamental level, parents question how their
children can be reared in a religious environment when they
must attend public schools. The evolution controversy provides
a battleground for this debate, but unfortunately the rhetoric
obscures the facts.
This Note discusses the state's power to control its schools'
curricula, and how the first amendment religion clauses restrict
that control. It applies the religion clauses to the teaching of the
theory of evolution and finds no violation of the establishment
clause. With respect to certain "strict" creationists, however, exposure to evolutionary theory may constitute an unconstitutional burden on the free exercise of religious beliefs. The proposed solution of balanced treatment with scientific creationism
200. See McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 233 (1948)(the Constitution does
not protect one from the "embarrassment that always attends non-conformity, whether
in religion, politics, behavior or dress"); Ashman, The Holy Bible in the Public Schools,
40 CORNELL L.Q. 475, 495 (1955)("part of the price of being a religious nonconformist is
the social stigma which all non-conformists have to bear").
201. Only "strict" separatists need be exempted, and they represent "only a small
minority of separatists." Note, supra note 9, at 564 n.239; see supra note 109 and accompanying text. The legislature could, of course, extend this relief more broadly if it desired, so long as the intent was religious neutrality and not overeager accommodation.
202. See Note, supra note 9, at 545.
203. Creationist students would miss merely 10% of biology class. See supra note
102. This is hardly a denial of a state benefit similar to the state compensation in
Thomas v. Review Bd., Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981), and Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). Moreover, creationist students do not want the "benefit"
they are being allowed to miss - evolution lessons. See Note, supra note 9, at 530 n.72
("[w]here an individual does not want a public benefit" there is no coercion against free
exercise).
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violates the establishment clause, however, and elimination ·of
evolution lessons altogether would be equally impermissible.
Consequently, exemption of the "strict" creationist student from
classes involving evolution along with minor curriculum modification provides appropriate relief.
-J. Greg Whitehair

